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mary sarah bilder 
The Corporate Origins of Judicial Review 
abstract.   This Article argues that the origins of judicial review lie in corporate law. 
Diverging from standard historical accounts that locate the origins in theories of fundamental 
law or in the American structure of government, the Article argues that judicial review was the 
continuation of a longstanding English practice of constraining corporate ordinances by 
requiring that they be not repugnant to the laws of the nation. This practice of limiting 
legislation under the standard of repugnancy to the laws of England became applicable to 
American colonial law. The history of this repugnancy practice explains why the Framers of the 
Constitution presumed that judges would void legislation repugnant to the Constitution—what 
is now referred to as judicial review. This history helps to resolve certain debates over the origins 
of judicial review and also explains why the answer to other controversies over judicial review 
may not be easily found in the history of the Founding era. The assumption that legislation must 
not be repugnant to the Constitution produced judicial review, but it did not resolve issues such 
as departmentalism or judicial supremacy that arose with the continuation of this repugnancy 
practice after the Constitution.  
author.   Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. My thanks to Bernard Bailyn, 
Alfred Brophy, Lawrence Cunningham, Michael Dorf, Richard Fallon, Elizabeth Foote, David 
Mackey, Catherine Patterson, David Seipp, Aviam Soifer, and the participants of the Boston 
College Faculty Colloquium, the Harvard Law School Legal History Colloquium, and the Yale 
Legal History Workshop. I also thank Michael Fleming, Nicole Liguori, and Michael Smith for 
research assistance, and Katie Sosnoff for interlibrary loan assistance. I am grateful to the Boston 
College Law School Fund for making possible some of this research. 
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introduction 
This Article traces a new historical account of the origins of judicial review. 
It argues that judicial review arose from a longstanding English corporate 
practice under which a corporation’s ordinances were reviewed for repugnancy 
to the laws of England. This English corporation law subsequently became a 
transatlantic constitution binding American colonial law by a similar standard 
of not being repugnant to the laws of England. After the Revolution, this 
practice of bounded legislation slid inexorably into a constitutional practice, as 
“the Constitution” replaced “the laws of England.” With the Constitution 
understood to embody the supreme authority of the people, the judiciary 
would void ordinary legislation repugnant to this supreme law. Over a century 
later, this practice gained a new name: judicial review. The widespread 
acceptance of this name eventually obscured the degree to which the origins of 
the practice lay in older practices regarding the delegated nature of corporate 
and colonial authorities, rather than in a new constitutional theory of judicial 
power. 
Only on rare occasions do we now think now about judicial review in terms 
of repugnancy. The word mainly appears in quotations of older court opinions. 
In 2005, Justice John Paul Stevens declared that “[b]ecause the statute itself is 
not repugnant to the Constitution . . . , the Court does not have the 
constitutional authority to invalidate it.”1 A recent opinion piece in the New 
York Times on judicial activism described judicial review as “an act ‘of great 
delicacy, and only to be performed where the repugnancy is clear.’”2  
Despite the contemporary infrequency of the word, what we think of as 
“judicial review” was once routinely described in terms of repugnancy. Kent’s 
Commentaries used the heading “Laws repugnant to the constitution void” to 
discuss judicial review.3 In 1889, almost a century of cases involving judicial 
review appeared in the U.S. Reports under the caption “Cases in Which 
Statutes or Ordinances Have Been Held To Be Repugnant to the Constitution 
 
1.  United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 283 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Marbury 
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)). 
2.  Paul Gewirtz & Chad Golder, So Who Are the Activists?, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2005, at A19 
(quoting Mayor v. Cooper, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 247, 251 (1867)). 
3.  1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW, at xvi, *448 (N.Y., O. Halsted 2d ed. 
1832). 
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or Laws of the United States.”4 Before judicial review had a name, the practice 
was understood in terms of review under a repugnancy standard.5 
Explanations of the origins of judicial review have not paid much attention 
to the word or to the idea of repugnancy.6 In fundamental law accounts, 
judicial review is legitimized by English constitutional and common law, often 
Dr. Bonham’s Case in particular, and codified as constitutional doctrine in 
Marbury v. Madison.7 In structuralist accounts, judicial review reflects the 
unique structures of American politics—for example, the invention of a written 
constitution, responses to federalism, belief in the people’s or popular 
 
4.  131 U.S. app. at ccxxxv (1889). 
5.  Because judicial review originally had no name, different terms have been used to discuss 
the practice. The concept of judicial duty was used by supporters such as Horace Gray in the 
mid-nineteenth century. JOSIAH QUINCY, JR., REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND ADJUDGED IN 
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE OF THE PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY, BETWEEN 
1761 AND 1772 app. 1, at 521 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1865) (appendix written by Horace 
Gray, Jr.) (declaring “the principle of American Constitutional Law, that it is the duty of the 
judiciary to declare unconstitutional statutes void”). By the end of the century, “judicial 
power,” a term used descriptively in the Constitution and as an early critique, had become a 
common term. See, e.g., BRINTON COXE, AN ESSAY ON JUDICIAL POWER AND 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL LEGISLATION (photo. reprint 2005) (1893); LARRY D. KRAMER, THE 
PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 172 (2004) 
(quoting William Jarvis’s 1820 letter to Thomas Jefferson on “judicial power”); Charles B. 
Elliott, The Legislatures and the Courts: The Power To Declare Statutes Unconstitutional, 5 POL. 
SCI. Q. 224 (1890). In 1909, Edward Corwin discussed “judicial review,” and for the last 
century this label has been universally adopted. Edward S. Corwin, The Supreme Court and 
the Fourteenth Amendment, 7 MICH. L. REV. 643, 660, 670 (1909). 
6.  For previous discussions, see, for example, ROBERT LOWRY CLINTON, MARBURY V. MADISON 
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 2, 22-24 (1989), which briefly discusses repugnancy in arguing that 
constitutional adjudication is “simply a special case of statutory construction.” For a critique 
of the judicial review scholarship as often based on the same evidence, see Dean Alfange, Jr., 
Marbury v. Madison and Original Understandings of Judicial Review: In Defense of Traditional 
Wisdom, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 329. 
7.  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); Dr. Bonham’s Case, (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 
646 (K.B.); Dr. Bonham’s Case, (1608) 77 Eng. Rep. 638 (C.P.). For such accounts, see, for 
example, Allen Dillard Boyer, “Understanding, Authority, and Will”: Sir Edward Coke and the 
Elizabethan Origins of Judicial Review, 39 B.C. L. REV. 43 (1997); Thomas C. Grey, Origins of 
the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. 
REV. 843 (1978); Philip Hamburger, Law and Judicial Duty, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 12-23 
(2003) [hereinafter Hamburger, Law and Judicial Duty]; Philip A. Hamburger, Revolution 
and Judicial Review: Chief Justice Holt’s Opinion in City of London v. Wood, 94 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2091 (1994); Suzanna Sherry, The Founders’ Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1127 (1987); and Sylvia Snowiss, From Fundamental Law to the Supreme Law of the Land: A 
Reinterpretation of the Origins of Judicial Review, 2 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 1 (1987). For 
emphasis on the English heritage, see J.M. SOSIN, THE ARISTOCRACY OF THE LONG ROBE: 
THE ORIGINS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN AMERICA (1989). 
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sovereignty, concerns about state legislative power, ideas about the separation 
of powers, distinctions of law and politics, the aspirations of an independent 
national judiciary, or even the post-Civil War power of the federal 
government.8 
Even when the word has been noticed, its genealogy has been of little 
interest. In a 2004 essay, Noah Feldman remarked on the fact that “repugnant” 
appears in both Dr. Bonham’s Case and Marbury.9 He commented, “I hope you 
will accept on faith, without demonstration, that the word ‘repugnant’ is a 
relatively rare word in legal discourse.”10 “Repugnant,” however, was not 
always a rare word in legal discourse. The history of its recurrence in both cases 
provides the crucial clue to the origins of judicial review. 
This history resolves three central concerns in the scholarship surrounding 
the origins of judicial review. These three issues can be phrased as whether the 
Framing generation intended judicial review to be part of the constitutional 
scheme; why the Framing generation presumed that judicial review was to 
 
8.  See, e.g., WILLIAM E. NELSON, MARBURY V. MADISON: THE ORIGINS AND LEGACY OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 95-96 (2000) (suggesting a transformation in attitudes toward judicial review over 
the nineteenth century from a strictly legal perspective to a more political one); 
CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, THE RISE OF MODERN JUDICIAL REVIEW: FROM CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION TO JUDGE-MADE LAW (1986) (suggesting a difference between 
“traditional” and “modern” policymaking judicial review); William R. Casto, James Iredell 
and the American Origins of Judicial Review, 27 CONN. L. REV. 329 (1995) (discussing the 
people’s sovereignty); Leslie Friedman Goldstein, Popular Sovereignty, the Origins of Judicial 
Review, and the Revival of Unwritten Law, 48 J. POL. 51 (1986) (discussing popular 
sovereignty); Matthew P. Harrington, Judicial Review Before John Marshall, 72 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 51 (2003) (discussing concerns over state legislative actions); Charles Hobson, John 
Marshall: The Formation of a Jurist, 16 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 315 (2002) (discussing 
the concept of an independent judiciary); Jack N. Rakove, Once More into the Judicial Breach, 
72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 381 (2003) (discussing federalism); Jack N. Rakove, The Origins of 
Judicial Review: A Plea for New Contexts, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1031 (1997) (same); Gordon S. 
Wood, The Origins of Judicial Review Revisited, or How the Marshall Court Made More Out of 
Less, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 787 (1999) (discussing multiple structural changes). 
9.  Noah Feldman, The Voidness of Repugnant Statutes: Another Look at the Meaning of Marbury, 
148 PROC. AM. PHIL. SOC’Y 27, 31 (2004); see Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177 (“Certainly all 
those who have framed written constitutions contemplate them as forming the fundamental 
and paramount law of the nation, and consequently the theory of every such government 
must be, that an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void.”); Dr. 
Bonham’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 646, 652 (“[I]t appears in our books, that in many cases, the 
common law will . . . controul Acts of Parliament, and sometimes adjudge them to be utterly 
void: for when an Act of Parliament is against common right and reason, or repugnant, or 
impossible to be performed, the common law will controul it, and adjudge such Act to be 
void . . . .”). 
10.  Feldman, supra note 9, at 31. 
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exist; and how the Framing generation thought judicial review should be 
practiced. 
Whether or not the Framers intended judicial review has been a 
longstanding debate. In the mid-nineteenth century, lawyers and historians 
began to investigate the precedents for judicial review. Since then the debate 
has been endless. William Crosskey famously argued that the Framers never 
intended judicial review.11 In the last few decades, although opinion has run in 
favor of some intent for judicial review, scholars have disagreed over the clarity 
of such intent. Saikrishna Prakash and John Yoo have argued for a clear intent 
to authorize judicial review,12 while Larry Kramer has suggested that the 
practice of judicial review was confused and contested.13 
This Article adopts a different stance by abandoning an intent-focused 
inquiry. Judicial review was neither created anew nor caught in a mist of 
confusion. Supporting scholarship by Maeva Marcus, William Treanor, and 
others who have demonstrated significant post-Revolutionary comfort with 
the practice of judicial review,14 this Article demonstrates that judicial review 
 
11.  2 WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE 
UNITED STATES 1000 (1953); cf. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: 
THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 1, 15 (Yale Univ. Press 2d ed. 1986) (1962) 
(arguing that although “the Framers of the Constitution specifically, if tacitly, expected that 
the federal courts would assume [such] a power,” the “power of judicial review, as it is 
called, does not derive from any explicit constitutional command”). 
12.  See Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Origins of Judicial Review, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 
887, 893-94 (2003) [hereinafter Prakash & Yoo, Origins]; see also Saikrishna B. Prakash & 
John C. Yoo, Questions for the Critics of Judicial Review, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 354 (2003) 
[hereinafter Prakash & Yoo, Questions] (arguing that the Constitution authorizes judicial 
review). An earlier article by Prakash and Yoo interestingly adopted language describing the 
Founders’ intent in terms of “assuming judicial review” and “natural presumption.” See 
Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Federalism 
Theories, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1459, 1497, 1522 (2001) (arguing that judicial review developed 
after 1776 and that the Constitution reflects the Founders’ presumption in favor of such 
judicial review). 
13.  KRAMER, supra note 5, at 77-78, 91-92; Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term—
Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 5 (2001) [hereinafter Kramer, We the Court]; 
Larry D. Kramer, When Lawyers Do History, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 387 (2003). 
14.  See Maeva Marcus, Judicial Review in the Early Republic, in LAUNCHING THE “EXTENDED 
REPUBLIC”: THE FEDERALIST ERA 25 (Ronald Hoffman & Peter J. Albert eds., 1996) (arguing 
that the Framers and Founders understood that federal judges would exercise judicial 
review); William Michael Treanor, The Case of the Prisoners and the Origins of Judicial 
Review, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 491 (1994) [hereinafter Treanor, Case of the Prisoners] (arguing 
that judicial review was uncontroversial in Virginia prior to Marbury); William Michael 
Treanor, Judicial Review Before Marbury, 58 STAN. L. REV. 455 (2005) [hereinafter Treanor, 
Judicial Review Before Marbury] (demonstrating the common practice of judicial review 
before Marbury); see also Scott Douglas Gerber, Introduction: The Supreme Court Before John 
BILDER FORMATTED_08-28-06 12/6/2006 5:58:03 PM 
the yale law journal 116:502   2006 
508 
 
was initially taken for granted and presumed to exist. Many members of the 
Framing generation presumed that courts would void legislation that was 
repugnant or contrary to a constitution. 
Why judicial review was taken for granted has also remained a matter of 
controversy. As Marcus has written, the “mystery lies in why and how” the 
Founding generation “came to think” that the judiciary possessed this power.15 
Fundamentalist accounts of the origins of judicial review attribute the idea to a 
belief in a fundamental, higher, or natural law that binds ordinary law—an 
argument that often relies heavily on Dr. Bonham’s Case. Yet as Kramer 
concluded, there is “little evidence” to support the idea that Dr. Bonham’s Case 
was important to American judicial review.16 He dismissed alternative colonial 
precedents, however: “[I]t is misleading to describe these antecedent [colonial 
and imperial] practices as a nascent or immature form of constitutional review 
. . . .”17 Others have shared this belief that colonial American practices are 
largely irrelevant because they were not “constitutional”—i.e., based on a 
written constitution.18 
This Article argues that the colonial American practice of bounded 
legislation under a repugnancy standard is causally responsible for the 
existence of American judicial review. This claim expands on suggestions made 
most recently by Barbara Black and Philip Hamburger about corporate 
practices19 and bolsters contentions long found in the scholarship of the British 
 
Marshall, in SERIATIM: THE SUPREME COURT BEFORE JOHN MARSHALL 1, 11 (Scott Douglas 
Gerber ed., 1998) (arguing that the Justices understood and advocated judicial review). 
15.  Marcus, supra note 14, at 52. 
16.  KRAMER, supra note 5, at 23. 
17.  Id. at 23-24. 
18.  See, e.g., P. Allan Dionisopoulos & Paul Peterson, Rediscovering the American Origins of 
Judicial Review: A Rebuttal to the Views Stated by Currie and Other Scholars, 18 J. MARSHALL L. 
REV. 49, 55-56 (1984) (discussing Privy Council review but ultimately rejecting it as 
precedent); Treanor, Judicial Review Before Marbury, supra note 14, at 468 n.45 (commenting 
that the colonial practice prior to the Constitution was “not judicial review, since the 
question was not one of constitutionality but of consistency with English law”). 
19.  See Barbara Aronstein Black, An Astonishing Political Innovation: The Origins of Judicial 
Review, 49 U. PITT. L. REV. 691, 692-93 (1988); Hamburger, Law and Judicial Duty, supra 
note 7, at 17 (“[T]he Privy Council and the colonial courts simply followed a practice 
familiar from the review of various domestic acts—including . . . most closely, the acts of 
corporations.”). Hamburger ultimately argued, however, that “broader conceptions of law 
and judicial duty,” not the review of corporate acts, were “the primary source of judicial 
review.” Hamburger, Law and Judicial Duty, supra note 7, at 13 n.41. For an earlier discussion 
of the possible link between corporate bylaws and judicial review, see Gordon E. Sherman, 
The Case of John Chandler v. The Secretary of War, 14 YALE L.J. 431, 447-50 (1905). In 
providing a more precise genealogy of the transformation from corporate to constitutional 
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empire about a possible link between imperial review practices and judicial 
review.20 The Founding generation presumed a practice of constitutional 
judicial review as an outgrowth of the experience of constraining corporate and 
colonial legislation by the laws of the nation. Continuity in the practice of 
constitutionally constraining legislation resulted in discontinuity in the 
relationship of legislature and judiciary. 
This claim is about past practices, not precedents. Conceptualized as an 
intellectual precedent, post-Revolutionary judicial review was not the same as 
colonial and corporate repugnancy review; understood as a practice, it was. 
Modern constitutional scholars have defined the search for the origins as a 
search for prior examples of coordinate review because they are most troubled 
by Supreme Court review of congressional acts—that is, by one branch of 
government reviewing the acts of another coordinate branch. Such an inquiry 
asks a question about judicial review based on a belief that the emerging strict 
theory of separation of powers consistently motivated the decisions of the 
Framing generation.21 
Experience, however, rather than logic, explains the history of judicial 
review. Coordinate judicial review was presumed because of an earlier practice 
that most frequently involved hierarchical authorities. The new conception of 
separation of powers was a theoretical critique—and, of course, there were a 
few who voiced it. Yet interestingly the practice of constraining legislation by a 
constitutional repugnancy standard was so well accepted that it initially 
blunted this potential concern. Over the nineteenth century this critique 
developed strength, until it became hard to think about judicial review in any 
other way. Nonetheless, the emergence of the critique should not obscure the 
causal explanation for the practice. Judicial review initially had no name 
because it was not an intellectual invention. 
 
practices, this Article comports with arguments claiming a “corporate analogy” in the minds 
of the Framers. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 
1432-36 (1987). 
20.  See, e.g., HAROLD D. HAZELTINE, APPEALS FROM COLONIAL COURTS TO THE KING IN COUNCIL, 
WITH ESPECIAL REFERENCE TO RHODE ISLAND 299-300 (Washington, Gov’t Printing Office 
1896) (1894) (suggesting a relationship between imperial practice and “the important 
doctrine of American jurisprudence which grants to the judiciary the power of setting aside 
an act of the legislature as being repugnant to the fundamental law of the land”); ELMER 
BEECHER RUSSELL, THE REVIEW OF AMERICAN COLONIAL LEGISLATION BY THE KING IN 
COUNCIL 227 (photo. reprint 1981) (1915) (suggesting that the Privy Council practice was “a 
precedent and a preparation” for “judicial annulment”). 
21.  For discussion of the development of the separation of powers theory in the 1780s, see JACK 
N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 276-77 (1996); and GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN 
REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 152, 449, 453, 549, 604 (1998). 
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The shift in focus from a genealogy of judicial power to a history of 
constrained legislation implicitly emphasizes the importance of understandings 
of delegated authority in the development of judicial review. This delegation 
theme places the story of early American judicial review in closer alignment 
with the accounts of the development of judicial review in other postcolonial 
nations.22 Throughout the British Empire, the practice of constraining colonial 
legislatures under a standard of repugnancy arose from “the constitutional 
relationship between the Imperial Parliament and the subordinate colonial 
legislatures.”23 The origins of judicial review in Canada and Australia have been 
thought to lie in this same imperial practice of a repugnancy standard.24 The 
longer duration of the imperial relationship in these countries produced 
different patterns in the practice of judicial review.25 
This question of how judicial review should be practiced motivates many 
investigations of its origins.26 This Article claims that because judicial review 
was a shifting cultural practice, not a new intellectual doctrine, the how 
question cannot be as convincingly answered based on the early history as the 
whether and why questions.27 Many authors have pointed to the fact that the 
Framing generation thought about the practice of judicial review differently 
 
22.  See Loren P. Beth, The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and the Development of Judicial 
Review, 24 AM. J. COMP. L. 22, 40-41 (1976) (“Judicial review may . . . owe much more to the 
example set by the Privy Council than to the necessities of federalism.”). 
23.  D.B. SWINFEN, IMPERIAL CONTROL OF COLONIAL LEGISLATION, 1813-1865: A STUDY OF 
BRITISH POLICY TOWARDS COLONIAL LEGISLATIVE POWERS 53 (1970); see Loren P. Beth, The 
Judicial Committee as Constitutional Court for the British Empire 1833-1971, 7 GA. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 47 (1977); Loren P. Beth, The Judicial Committee: Its Development, Organisation and 
Procedure, 1975 PUB. L. 219; Beth, supra note 22 (discussing appeals from dependencies). 
24.  See JOHN GOLDRING, THE PRIVY COUNCIL AND THE AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION 10-11 
(1996); EDWARD MCWHINNEY, FEDERAL CONSTITUTION-MAKING FOR A MULTI-NATIONAL 
WORLD 9-10 (1966); B.L. STRAYER, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF LEGISLATION IN CANADA 6 (1968). 
But see B. Galligan, Judicial Review in the Australian Federal System: Its Origin and Function, 10 
FED. L. REV. 367, 368 (1979) (arguing that the origin for Australian judicial review is United 
States precedent rather than imperial practices). My thanks to Keven Booker for assistance 
with this point. 
25.  The Colonial Laws Validity Act attempted to address ambiguities regarding what 
constituted repugnancy by providing that colonial laws could be declared void “on the 
ground of repugnancy to the law of England” only if they were repugnant to an act of 
Parliament. An Act To Remove Doubts as to the Validity of Colonial Laws, 1865, 28 & 29 
Vict., c. 63, § 3; see ALEX C. CASTLES, AN AUSTRALIAN LEGAL HISTORY 405-12 (1982); 
SWINFEN, supra note 23, at 167-86. 
26.  See, e.g., CLINTON, supra note 6, at 1; William E. Nelson, Marbury v. Madison, Democracy, 
and the Rule of Law, 71 TENN. L. REV. 217 (2004). 
27.  See Mary Sarah Bilder, Idea or Practice: A Brief Historiography of Judicial Review 3-13 
(Aug. 9, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
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than we do today.28 The corporate, colonial, and constitutional repugnancy 
practice suggests new boundaries with respect to what history can tell us about 
how the modern practice of judicial review should operate. 
This account diminishes support for certain modern claims about the scope 
of review. The practice presumed by the Founders emphasized the bounded 
nature of legislation limited by the laws of the nation. This history casts doubt 
on arguments that general “natural law” was regularly accepted as a legitimate 
basis for review.29 There are strains of English and American legal thought that 
relate to a tradition regarding laws of nature (although the degree to which this 
idea is identical to current “natural law” ideology might be questioned); 
however, these strains were not perceived as the dominant constraints on 
legislation. The laws of the realm, the laws of the nation, and the 
Constitution—not free-floating natural law—limited ordinary legislation.30 
This history helps to explain the pattern of post-constitutional judicial 
review practice.31 Courts embraced vertical review (federal review of state 
courts) relatively early because of its similarity to earlier hierarchical review.32 
State courts practiced judicial review of state legislation in states that viewed 
their constitution, not their legislature, as the supreme authority.33 Although 
horizontal federal review was assumed and initially practiced,34 the 
implications of such review were not well contemplated. The reasons for the 
 
28.  See, e.g., KRAMER, supra note 5, at 62, 250-51; NELSON, supra note 8, at 3. 
29.  For critical discussions of the natural law claim, see Goldstein, supra note 8; and Helen K. 
Michael, The Role of Natural Law in Early American Constitutionalism: Did the Founders 
Contemplate Judicial Enforcement of “Unwritten” Individual Rights?, 69 N.C. L. REV. 421 
(1991). 
30.  Two cases in which the Court referred to fundamental law limits on legislation involved 
Connecticut and Rhode Island. Wilkinson v. Leland, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 627 (1829); Calder v. 
Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798). In both states, the original colonial charters operated as 
new state constitutions. The absence of written and ratified constitutions makes these cases 
tricky precedents for general constitutional principles. 
31.  See MARY SARAH BILDER, THE TRANSATLANTIC CONSTITUTION: COLONIAL LEGAL CULTURE 
AND THE EMPIRE 193-96 (2004). 
32.  On the dominance of review of state legislation, see R. Kent Newmyer, Chief Justice Marshall 
in the Context of His Times, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 841, 846-48 (1999). 
33.  Rhode Island is an exception that supports this point. The state legislature insisted on 
supremacy, and the state did not write a constitution until 1843; consequently, the state 
supreme court did not strike down state statutes until the mid-nineteenth century. See 
BILDER, supra note 31, at 279 n.11; see also Theodore W. Ruger, “A Question Which Convulses 
a Nation”: The Early Republic’s Greatest Debate About the Judicial Review Power, 117 HARV. L. 
REV. 826 (2004) (discussing Kentucky’s experiment in the 1820s of declared legislative 
supremacy through the evisceration of state judicial review). 
34.  See Prakash & Yoo, Origins, supra note 12, at 900-02. 
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absence of the practice in the nineteenth century deserve more attention. The 
growing strength of the rhetorics of separation of powers and popular 
sovereignty, the changing views of the legitimacy of the Constitution as the 
will of the people, the dominance of admiralty issues on the early Supreme 
Court docket, and the ways in which litigation and disputes over congressional 
legislation were framed may have contributed to the apparent disappearance of 
the issue for decades. 
Equally importantly, this account suggests that other modern concerns 
about judicial review may be hard to resolve by looking to the history of the 
Founding era. The dominance of the “repugnancy” rubric helps to explain why 
early judicial review did not articulate a precise standard for review or define 
the appropriate level of scrutiny. While the commitment to avoiding 
repugnancies was clearly articulated, the conception of what represented a 
repugnancy was not. The simultaneous ambiguity and certainty of the phrase 
“repugnant to the Constitution” meant that judges did not initially have to 
confront whether they were engaged in what we would call narrow or broad 
constructions of the Constitution. Early cases may—or may not—support both 
expansive and restrictive approaches to review.35 
Similarly, because judicial review arose out of a prior practice rather than 
an idea about separation of powers, there may not have been a coherent or 
accepted understanding of whether the judiciary alone was the ultimate 
interpreter of the Constitution—the modern issues of judicial supremacy and 
departmentalism.36 The practice of repugnancy made it easy to assume that the 
 
35.  For recent discussion, see Treanor, Judicial Review Before Marbury, supra note 14, at 557-61, 
which argues that courts used judicial review to keep legislative power within appropriate 
institutional boundaries and struck down state statutes affecting the judiciary and juries 
even when they were not clearly unconstitutional. See also CLINTON, supra note 6 (arguing 
for a narrow original understanding of review); Casto, supra note 8 (arguing that judicial 
review was limited to cases in which the statute was unconstitutional beyond dispute); 
Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 
COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000) (arguing that courts originally were to possess only a limited 
power of review in unambiguous cases). A related inquiry involves the types of rights that 
were protected by judicial review. See Nelson, supra note 26 (arguing that judicial review 
was meant to protect not minority rights but rather common rights). 
36.  For discussion of supremacy and departmental questions in the post-1787 period, see, for 
example, KRAMER, supra note 5; David E. Engdahl, John Marshall’s “Jeffersonian” Concept of 
Judicial Review, 42 DUKE L.J. 279 (1992); Daniel A. Farber, Judicial Review and Its 
Alternatives: An American Tale, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 415 (2003); John Harrison, The 
Constitutional Origins and Implications of Judicial Review, 84 VA. L. REV. 333 (1998); Kramer, 
We the Court, supra note 13; Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Irrepressible Myth of Marbury, 101 
MICH. L. REV. 2706 (2003); Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Marbury and Judicial Deference: 
The Shadow of Whittington v. Polk and the Maryland Judiciary Battle, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 58 
(2002); Sylvia Snowiss, The Marbury of 1803 and the Modern Marbury, 20 CONST. 
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judiciary would have such power but said far less with respect to other 
conceivable constitutional arbiters. The belief in a constitutionally constrained 
legislative power coexisted with an aspiration to separation of powers. After the 
ratification of the Constitution, as separation of powers became increasingly 
accepted as the highest constitutional principle, these questions came into 
focus. While the Founding history can provide a guide to some concerns about 
judicial review, others we must wrestle with unaided. 
i. repugnancy and corporations 
This history of judicial review begins with “repugnancy.” Repugnant was a 
relatively common word in early English law. It appeared in the thirteenth 
century in Bracton,37 in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries in the Year 
Books,38 and in the sixteenth century in the works of Edward Coke.39 The 
usage of the word did not carry the modern connotation of unpleasantness or 
repulsiveness. “Repugnant” meant “inconsistent” or “self-contradictory.” It 
often appeared in conjunction or was used interchangeably with “contrary.”40 
Lord Ellesmere thus noted, “If the words of a statute be contraryant or 
repugnant, what is there then to be said?”41 “Repugnant” frequently described 
 
COMMENT. 231 (2003); and G. Edward White, The Constitutional Journey of Marbury v. 
Madison, 89 VA. L. REV. 1463 (2003). 
37.  2 HENRY DE BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 80, 168, 170, 239, 319, 322 
(Samuel E. Thorne trans., 1968) (c. 1220-1250). 
38.  A search of David Seipp’s Year Book database in September 2006 produced forty-six cases 
between 1307 and 1463 in which “repugnant” appeared in the commentary and paraphrase, 
process and pleading, or language notes sections. David J. Seipp, Legal History: The Year 
Books, http://www.bu.edu/law/seipp/ (select “Search Year Books”) (last visited Sept. 3, 
2006). 
39.  A search of the English Reports in the Justis.com database produced forty-three cases in 
Coke’s Reports matching “repugnant” or “repugnancy.” See also 1 EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST 
PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND § 213, at 142 (photo. reprint 1979) 
(London, Societie of Stationers 1628); 2 id. § 334, at 206v; id. § 362, at 224; id. § 384, at 237; 
id. § 520, at 297. 
40.  See 13 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 675-76 (2d ed. 1989) (defining “repugnant” as 
“[c]ontrary or contradictory to, inconsistent or incompatible with”); Y.B. 14 Edw. 2, fol. 29, 
pl. 60 (1321) (Seipp No. 1321.213ss), reprinted in 86 SELDEN SOCIETY 190 (1969), available at 
http://www.bu.edu/phpbin/lawyearbooks/search.php (search by “Seipp Number” for this 
and all such references below) (stating that franchises should not be “repugnant ne 
contrariant”). 
41.  S.E. Thorne, Dr. Bonham’s Case, 1938 LAW Q. REV. 543, 549 [hereinafter Thorne, Dr. 
Bonham’s Case], reprinted in S.E. THORNE, ESSAYS IN ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 269, 275 
(Hambledon Press 1985). 
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a problematic relationship between texts, for example, provisions in statutes, 
grants, deeds, wills, writs, counts, and judgments. Francis Bacon discussed 
situations in which there was a “direct contrariety and repugnancy” between 
two statutes.42 “Repugnant” or “contrary” also came to designate the 
boundaries of proper hierarchical relationship between bodies of law.43 Under 
Henry VIII, this hierarchical use of “repugnancy” became increasingly 
prevalent and came to regulate the relationship between English law and 
ecclesiastical law,44 as well as English law and Welsh law.45 
“Repugnancy” also appeared in the law of corporations. Corporate treatises 
declared that corporate bylaws could not be repugnant to the laws of the 
nation. In 1659, the first English treatise on corporations discussed “What 
Ordinances a Corporation may make.”46 Ordinances were not to be “repugnant 
to the Lawes of the Nation, against the publick and common good of the 
people within or without the same City.”47 The same rule appeared in later 
 
42.  FRANCIS BACON, The Maxims of the Law (c. 1597), in 7 THE WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON 327, 
371 (photo. reprint 1996) (James Spedding ed., London, Longmans & Co. new ed. 1879) 
(maxim 19). 
43.  See Faith Thompson, Parliamentary Confirmations of the Great Charter, 38 AM. HIST. REV. 
659, 662, 669-70 (1933) (noting that Magna Carta constrained certain statutes with 
“contrary”). 
44.  See Act of Supremacy Act, 1558, 1 Eliz., c. 1; Canon Law Act, 1549, 3 & 4 Edw. 6, c. 11 
(requiring that ecclesiastical laws be not “cont[r]ary to any comon Lawe or Statute of this 
Realme”); Religion Act, 1540, 32 Hen. 8, c. 26 (forbidding decrees and ordinances 
“repugnant or contrariant to the lawes and statutes of this Realme”); Ecclesiastical Licenses 
Act, 1533, 25 Hen. 8, c. 21, § 3; Submission of the Clergy Act, 1533, 25 Hen. 8, c. 19, pmbl., 
§§ 2, 7; J. Duncan M. Derrett, Thomas More and the Legislation of the Corporation of London, 5 
GUILDHALL MISCELLANY 175, 175-80 (1963); William Huse Dunham, Jr., Regal Power and the 
Rule of Law: A Tudor Paradox, J. BRIT. STUD., May 1964, at 24, 36. 
45.  See Laws in Wales Act, 1542, 34 & 35 Hen. 8, c. 26, § 26; Laws in Wales Act, 1535, 27 Hen. 8, 
c. 26 (mentioning offices not “repugnaunt” to this act); P.R. Roberts, The “Henry VIII 
Clause”: Delegated Legislation and the Tudor Principality of Wales, in LEGAL RECORD AND 
HISTORICAL REALITY 37 (Thomas G. Watkin ed., 1989) [hereinafter Roberts, Henry VIII 
Clause]; Peter R. Roberts, Wales and England After the Tudor “Union”: Crown, Principality, 
and Parliament, 1543-1624, in LAW AND GOVERNMENT UNDER THE TUDORS 111 (Claire Cross 
et al. eds., 1988). 
46.  WILLIAM SHEPHEARD, OF CORPORATIONS, FRATERNITIES, AND GUILDS 81 (London, H. 
Twyford, T. Dring, & J. Plate 1659). The word “ordinance” traditionally indicated an 
enactment or regulation of the Crown rather than Parliament. See S.B. CHRIMES, ENGLISH 
CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS IN THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY 269-77 (1936); Roberts, Henry VIII 
Clause, supra note 45, at 39; see also F.W. MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF 
ENGLAND 186-90 (photo. reprint 2001) (1908) (discussing the differences between statutes 
and ordinances). 
47.  SHEPHEARD, supra note 46, at 81-82. 
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treatises on corporations, with “contrary” at times replacing “repugnant.” In 
1712, a corporate treatise stated that it was “usual” to include a clause in a 
corporate charter that bylaws “be not repugnant to the Laws of the Nation nor 
against the publick and common Good of the People.”48 In 1765, William 
Blackstone explained that corporations had power to make bylaws “unless 
contrary to the laws of the land, and then they are void.”49 In 1850, James 
Grant declared that courts could not uphold any bylaw “which is repugnant to, 
or inconsistent with, the laws of the land.”50 
A. Corporations and Bylaws 
This principle that corporate ordinances or bylaws were bounded by the 
laws of the nation had a long history arising from understandings of delegated 
jurisdictions. As late-eighteenth-century commentators noted, a similar rule 
was found in the Twelve Tables in Roman law.51 Within English law, under 
Edward I, such jurisdictions were conceptualized as instances in which the 
 
48.  LAWS CONCERNING TRADE, AND TRADESMEN 8 (Stafford, Eng., J. Nutt 1712). The author 
noted that a repugnancy clause was unnecessary because “the Law doth understand that . . . 
[a]nd such By-Laws made by a Corporation are void by the very Common-Law.” Id. at 9. 
49.  1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *476; see also 2 STEWART KYD, A TREATISE ON THE 
LAW OF CORPORATIONS 109 (London, J. Butterworth 1794) (“If a bye-law be contrary to the 
general laws of the kingdom, it is void . . . .”). 
50.  JAMES GRANT, A PRACTICAL TREATISE IN THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 77 (photo. reprint 
1993) (1850); see also JOSEPH K. ANGELL & SAMUEL AMES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS AGGREGATE 183 (photo. reprint 1972) (1832) (“[A]ll by-laws of a 
corporation, contrary to the constitutional law of the land, must be void.”). The repugnancy 
principle is similar to, but not the same as, the later ultra vires doctrine. The ultra vires 
doctrine developed in the mid-nineteenth century and limited a corporation’s activities to 
the purposes and activities expressed in the charter. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Cyclical 
Transformations of the Corporate Form: A Historical Perspective on Corporate Social 
Responsibility, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 767, 800 (2005); Kent Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives! A 
Stakeholder Analysis of Corporate Illegality (with Notes on How Corporate Law Could Reinforce 
International Law Norms), 87 VA. L. REV. 1279, 1302-09 (2001). The British version of judicial 
review is interestingly often described as ultra vires review. See, e.g., David Jenkins, From 
Unwritten to Written: Transformation in the British Common-Law Constitution, 36 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 863, 893-905 (2003). 
51.  The Twelve Tables VIII.27 (c. 450 B.C.E.), in ANCIENT ROMAN STATUTES 12 (photo. reprint 
2003) (Allan Chester Johnson et al. eds. & trans., 1961) (“These guild members shall have 
the power . . . to make for themselves any rule that they may wish provided that they impair 
no part of the public law.”); see also Decree of the Senate on Guilds of Greek Artists (112 
B.C.E.), in ANCIENT ROMAN STATUTES, supra, at 48, 48-49 (voiding certain guild 
agreements). For discussion of the Tables, see 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 49, at *476; and 2 
JAMES WILSON, Of Corporations (1791), in THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 570, 571 (Robert 
Green McCloskey ed., 1967) (1804). 
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King had delegated liberties.52 As a matter of history, not all delegated 
jurisdictions had arisen from actual acts of royal delegation; some had 
independent origins arising from the Conquest or other ancient practices. 
Gradually, however, these franchises or privileges came to be understood as 
“all exercises of the king’s rights by private persons.”53 As Bracton explained, in 
a “delegated jurisdiction,” the “ordinances and edicts [must] be in accordance 
with the law and the approved customs and with the common welfare.”54 
Franchises were thus limited by national law, and failure to comply with the 
standard could bring a quo warranto suit and possible forfeiture of the 
franchise.55 
Corporations were a particular type of delegated jurisdiction within the 
“King’s exclusive prerogative.”56 Most corporations arose when the Crown 
granted franchises, liberties, rights, powers, privileges, immunities, or property 
to a group by letters patent. A corporation thus held delegated authority as a 
body politic.57 The specific meaning of “corporation” developed over centuries. 
The use of the term “corporate” in English law as referring to what we would 
today call a corporate entity appeared by 1410 in the Year Books.58 Formal legal 
discussions of the capacities of the corporation, however, belonged to the late 
 
52.  DONALD W. SUTHERLAND, QUO WARRANTO PROCEEDINGS IN THE REIGN OF EDWARD I, 1278-
1294, at 182 (1963). 
53.  Id. at 5. 
54.  2 BRACTON, supra note 37, at 306-07. 
55.  See SUTHERLAND, supra note 52, at 9; id. at 179 (discussing interference by the King’s courts 
if “a franchise was of such a form as to ‘impede common justice’”). On franchise theory, see 
Helen M. Cam, The Evolution of the Mediaeval English Franchise, 32 SPECULUM 427 (1957). 
56.  Janet McLean, The Transnational Corporation in History: Lessons for Today?, 79 IND. L.J. 363, 
364 (2004). 
57.  See, e.g., SHEPHEARD, supra note 46, at title page (including as a subtitle of the treatise “The 
Learning of the Law touching Bodies-Politique”). 
58.  Y.B. 11 Hen. 4, fol. 47a, Hil., pl. 21 (1410) (Seipp No. 1410.021) (mentioning “un University 
fuit corporate”); see also Case of Gloucester School (C.P. 1410), in SOURCES OF ENGLISH LEGAL 
HISTORY: PRIVATE LAW TO 1750, at 613 (J.H. Baker & S.F.C. Milsom eds., 1986) (English 
version). Earlier cases involving entities that would later be understood as corporate also 
exist. See, e.g., Y.B. 11 Edw. 3, Lib. Ass., fol. 30a, pl. 9 (1337) (Seipp No. 1337.136ass), cited in 
ROBERT BROOKE, LA GRAUNDE ABRIDGEMENT (London, Richard Tottell 1573); Y.B. 10 Edw. 
3, Lib. Ass., fol. 26a, pl. 13 (1336) (Seipp No. 1336.225ass), cited in BROOKE, supra. On the 
early development of the corporation, see 9 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH 
LAW 45-71 (1926); and 1 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE 
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 486-511 (Cambridge Univ. Press 
1968) (2d ed. 1898). Anthony Fitzherbert’s abridgment discussed corporations under the 
heading “Graunt.” See 2 ANTHONY FITZHERBERT, LA GRAUNDE ABRIDGEMENT fol. 180 
(London, John Rastell & Wynkyn de Worde 1516); 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra, at 53 n.3. 
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sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries when incorporations increased.59 In 
1573, Robert Brooke’s published abridgment summarized cases under the 
heading “corporations & capacities.”60 A decade later, A Discourse of 
Corporations listed the types: municipal corporations (cities, boroughs, and 
towns), ecclesiastical bodies, universities and colleges, guilds and fraternities, 
and livery and trading companies.61 In 1628, Edward Coke’s Institutes discussed 
the legal modes of establishment: royal letters patent, act of Parliament, or 
prescription.62 In 1659, this legal exploration culminated in William 
Shepheard’s entire treatise on the corporation, a “Body Politick that indureth in 
perpetuall sucession.”63 
The authority to issue bylaws was understood as one of the five legal 
incidents of the corporation.64 The precise origins of bylaw authority are 
somewhat unclear. The roots likely lay in Roman law and early English law.65 
Martin Weinbaum concluded that in the 1300s, “the privilege of issuing by-
laws . . . as an explicit point of a charter . . . remained to be secured for the 
mass of boroughs.”66 By the sixteenth century, however, corporations and 
 
59.  See ROBERT TITTLER, THE REFORMATION AND THE TOWNS IN ENGLAND: POLITICS AND 
POLITICAL CULTURE, C. 1540-1640, at 89, 161-62, 240 (1998). 
60.  1 BROOKE, supra note 58, fols. 188-92. 
61.  A Discourse of Corporations (c. 1587-1589), in 3 TUDOR ECONOMIC DOCUMENTS 265, 273 (R.H. 
Tawney & Eileen Power eds., 1924); see 1 HENRY ALWORTH MEREWETHER & ARCHIBALD 
JOHN STEPHENS, THE HISTORY OF THE BOROUGHS AND MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS OF THE 
UNITED KINGDOM, at xxviii-xxix, xxxi (London, Stevens & Sons 1835). 
62.  2 COKE, supra note 39, § 413, at 250. 
63.  SHEPHEARD, supra note 46, at 1-2. 
64.  W.S. Holdsworth, English Corporation Law in the 16th and 17th Centuries, 31 YALE L.J. 382, 
390-91 (1922). The five incidents were perpetual succession, the power to sue and be sued, 
the power to hold lands, a common seal, and the authority to issue bylaws. MARTIN 
WEINBAUM, THE INCORPORATION OF BOROUGHS 18 (1937). The five characteristics seem 
“firmer in the minds of legal theorists” of later periods than in the minds of “lawyers and 
government officials in Tudor times.” TITTLER, supra note 59, at 88. When “corporation” 
began to imply all five incidents remains vague. Compare MAITLAND, supra note 46, at 53-54 
(suggesting the fifteenth century), and WEINBAUM, supra, at 18 (same), with TITTLER, supra 
note 59, at 87-88 (suggesting the mid-fourteenth century, although there long remained a 
“disconcerting imprecision to the concept”). 
65.  See ADOLPHUS BALLARD & JAMES TAIT, BRITISH BOROUGH CHARTERS, 1216-1307, at lxxxvii 
(1923) (“[The] only express charter grant of the right to make bye-laws was made not to a 
royal borough, but to the mesne borough of Oswestry in 1263.”); C.A. COOKE, 
CORPORATION, TRUST AND COMPANY 69 (1950); The Twelve Tables VIII.27, supra note 51, 
at 12. 
66.  WEINBAUM, supra note 64, at 49; see Y.B. 44 Edw. 3, fol. 18b, Trin., pl. 13 (1370) (Seipp No. 
1370.070) (discussing “laws called by-laws”). Richard II’s 1390 letters patent to the 
Merchant Tailors’ Company gave power to “make ordinances.” Letters Patent of Richard II 
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bylaw authority were synonymous. The corporation was the “unitinge of a 
Societie . . . into one bodie by the Prince or Soueraigne, havinge aucthoritie to 
make lawes and ordinances.”67 
B. Limits on Bylaws 
The bylaw authority of boroughs and town corporations appears to have 
been constrained by national law and the royal prerogative from a relatively 
early period. Weinbaum described a charter in 1263 in which powers were 
given to make ordinances and agreements, along with “a clause ‘saving our 
prerogative.’”68 Frederic William Maitland discussed a dispute over a London 
ordinance in the reign of Edward II prohibiting retail fish sales on the wharf in 
which the King’s counsel argued that “it is not lawful” for an ordinance to be 
made “without consulting the king.”69 In the fourteenth century, Richard II’s 
charter to London authorized the city to alter its customs by ordinance if “such 
ordinance shall be profitable to us and our people and consonant with good 
faith and reason.”70 William Holdsworth declared that even early bylaws “were 
always liable to be called in question before the king’s courts.”71 The bylaw 
authority of the corporation of London was particularly controversial because 
 
(Jul. 30, 1390), in FREDERICK MORRIS FRY & R.T.D. SAYLE, THE CHARTERS OF THE 
MERCHANT TAYLORS’ COMPANY 13, 14 (1937); see also Letters Patent of Henry IV (Aug. 2, 
1408), in FRY & SAYLE, supra, at 15, 17; Letters Patent of Henry VI (Feb. 24, 1439), in FRY & 
SAYLE, supra, at 19, 21. 
67.  A Discourse of Corporations, supra note 61, at 265; see TITTLER, supra note 59, at 162-63 (“The 
right to issue by-laws had long been exercised de facto by many town governments, but 
incorporation conveyed royal sanction on the practice.”). 
68.  WEINBAUM, supra note 64, at 22 (citation omitted); see also 2 BOROUGH CUSTOMS 59 (Mary 
Bateson ed., Selden Soc’y vol. 21, 1906) (discussing borough customs that referenced 
“natural reason,” “the laws of England,” “the comon lawe of Kent,” and “jura naturalia”). 
69.  1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 58, at 661 (citation omitted). Maitland added, however, 
that bylaws were almost never condemned and that “we obtain no jurisprudence of by-laws, 
no established tests for their validity.” Id. at 662. 
70.  CAROLINE M. BARRON, LONDON IN THE LATER MIDDLE AGES: GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE, 
1200-1500, at 34 (2004) (quoting THE HISTORICAL CHARTERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
DOCUMENTS OF THE CITY OF LONDON 75 (W. de Gray Birch ed., London, Whiting & Co. rev. 
ed. 1887)). 
71.  2 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 58, at 391; see also id. at 399-400. Holdsworth argued that the 
principle that a charter could not give the corporation power to violate the common law was 
established in the Middle Ages. See Holdsworth, supra note 64, at 385; see also Lowestoft v. 
Yarmouth (Ch. 1378), in SELECT CASES BEFORE THE KING’S COUNCIL, 1243-1482, at 60, 61-
62, 66-69 (I.S. Leadam & J.F. Baldwin eds., Selden Soc’y vol. 35, 1918) (discussing the 
charter of Yarmouth and its consistency with statutes). 
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London long claimed that it arose in part from immemorial custom rather than 
newly delegated authority from the Crown.72 
Incorporated guilds and livery companies, which took their name from the 
particular livery their members were authorized to wear, also held constrained 
bylaw authority. By the fifteenth century, twelve great London livery 
companies held letters patent from the Crown: the mercers, grocers, drapers, 
fishmongers, goldsmiths, skinners, merchant tailors, haberdashers, salters, 
ironmongers, vintners, and clothworkers.73 The companies “effectively 
controlled” London’s economy throughout the sixteenth century74—by the 
middle of which, historian Steve Rappaport estimated, “approximately three-
quarters of London’s men were citizens and members of livery companies.”75 
The companies’ charters permitted them to govern particular trades.76 They 
dominated political power because most important city officials were 
associated with a company.77 In addition, they served as a source of significant 
financial revenues for city and Crown, and they administered charitable trusts, 
schools, almshouses, churches, and relief for the poor.78 
Since the early 1400s, these companies were “bodies corporate and politic” 
with the power to “make good and reasonable bye-laws and ordinances.”79 The 
ordinances regulated those within and without the company. Companies had 
the power to pass their own bylaws and were given the power of “search,” the 
ability to enter and search for illegal goods and to fine the offenders.80 For 
example, the fishmongers had the “oversight and rejection of fish brought to 
 
72.  See Derrett, supra note 44, at 176-80; see also 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 49, at *74-75; 
ALEXANDER PULLING, THE LAWS, CUSTOMS, USAGES, AND REGULATIONS OF THE CITY AND 
PORT OF LONDON 43-50 (2d ed. 1854); cf. Y.B. 21 Edw. 4, fol. 67a, Mich. (2d), pl. 50 (1481) 
(Seipp No. 1481.118) (reporting a judge’s statement that London’s customs, though 
confirmed by Parliament, were “bad usage” and not founded on reason); Y.B. 49 Edw. 3, 
Lib. Ass., fol. 320b, pl. 8 (1375) (Seipp No. 1375.048ass) (discussing whether London could 
establish guilds with corporate powers and its power to make “statutes [estat]”); Y.B. 49 
Edw. 3, fol. 3b, Hil., pl. 7 (1375) (Seipp No. 1375.007) (same). 
73.  See 1 WILLIAM HERBERT, THE HISTORY OF THE TWELVE GREAT LIVERY COMPANIES OF 
LONDON, at xiv-xv (Augustus M. Kelley 1968) (1834); GEORGE UNWIN, THE GILDS AND 
COMPANIES OF LONDON (1908). 
74.  STEVE RAPPAPORT, WORLDS WITHIN WORLDS: STRUCTURES OF LIFE IN SIXTEENTH-CENTURY 
LONDON 186 (1989). 
75.  Id. at 53. 
76.  See BARRON, supra note 70, at 199-234; 1 HERBERT, supra note 73, at xiv-xv, 28, 106-10. 
77.  BARRON, supra note 70, at 139; RAPPAPORT, supra note 74, at 189. 
78.  See BARRON, supra note 70, at 225-26, 232. 
79.  1 HERBERT, supra note 73, at 102-03. 
80.  RAPPAPORT, supra note 74, at 187. 
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London.”81 Companies regulated apprenticeship and forbade the disclosure of 
trade secrets.82 The company courts also heard many disputes arising under 
their ordinances.83 By the sixteenth century, “[n]early one hundred companies 
and other types of occupational associations regulated virtually all of London’s 
crafts and trades . . . , devising and enforcing ordinances which shaped the very 
nature of men’s work.”84 
The bylaws and ordinances of these companies had been subject to 
constraints since the fourteenth century. In 1388, Richard II ordered the Mayor 
of London to require the guilds and fraternities to deliver copies of their rules 
and ordinances or else lose their charters.85 The returns revealed awareness of 
bylaw constraints. The Gild of St. Christopher in Norwich barred ordinances 
in prejudice of the common law. The Peltiers’ Gild stated that ordinances were 
not to be against the King’s right or “his lawe.” The Carpenters’ Gild stated 
that ordinances were not to be against the “kyngis right ne the comoun lawe, 
ne no prejudice don to no maner man.”86 
In 1437, parliamentary legislation placed an enforceable limit on corporate 
bylaw authority. A petition to Henry VI had complained that guilds, 
fraternities, and other “companies incorporate” had made “unlawful and 
unreasonable ordinances” that diminished the King’s prerogative and resulted 
in “common damage to the people.” Companies should therefore “make [or] 
use no ordinance which shall be to the disherison or diminution of the King’s 
franchises, or of other, nor against the common profit of the people.”87 The 
resulting act limited corporate ordinances and placed greater control in 
municipal authorities. Company ordinances had to be “first discussed and 
approved” by the justices of the peace or the governors of cities; if found to be 
“not lawful or not reasonable,” the ordinances were to be “revoked and 
 
81.  1 HERBERT, supra note 73, at 47. 
82.  Id. at 45-46. 
83.  See id. at 201-14. 
84.  Id. at 25-26. 
85.  W. CAREW HAZLITT, THE LIVERY COMPANIES OF THE CITY OF LONDON 49 (London, Swan 
Sonnenschein & Co. 1892); see BARRON, supra note 70, at 208 (describing the requirement to 
deliver rules and ordinances for inspection); ENGLISH GILDS 128 (Joshua Toulmin Smith ed., 
London, N. Trübner & Co. 1870); 1 HERBERT, supra note 73, at 28, 36. 
86.  ENGLISH GILDS, supra note 85, at 23, 30, 39. 
87.  A Restraint of Unlawful Orders Made by Masters of Guilds, Fraternities, and Other 
Companies, 1437, 15 Hen. 6, c. 6, in 3 THE STATUTES AT LARGE 215, 215-16 (Danby Pickering 
ed., Cambridge, Joseph Bentham 1762); see 1 HERBERT, supra note 73, at 106-07; cf. 
RAPPAPORT, supra note 74, at 184 (noting the obligation to submit ordinances for approval). 
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repealed” under penalty of the corporation’s losing its authority under the 
letters patent and forfeiting a fine of £10 per “contrary” ordinance.88 
For the remainder of the fifteenth century, municipal authorities in London 
and York reviewed corporate ordinances. In 1439, the London tailors and 
saddlers had their ordinances reviewed as to “whether they were contrary to 
the city’s liberties or not.”89 In 1462, the court of aldermen told the 
fishmongers that they could not use their ordinances until they were 
submitted.90 In 1487, company officials were not to “make Ordinances unless 
they are approved and ratified” by the mayor and aldermen. The companies 
thus “brought in their Book of Ordinances, which, not being approved of, were 
cancelled, and the leaves on which they were written, torn out.”91 By the late 
fifteenth century, “at least sixteen crafts had their ordinances enrolled in the 
city’s Letter Book” and approved.92 
Under Henry VII, Crown control of company ordinances began to supplant 
municipal control. The Crown enforced limited bylaw authority through 
declarations in letters patent and review requirements. The Crown gave initial 
authority to a company through letters patent, a grant delegating privileges 
and authority (sometimes referred to colloquially as a charter). Early patents 
might include a reasonableness requirement;93 later patents began explicitly to 
limit delegated authority. In 1503, the Merchant Tailors’ new letters patent 
authorized “statutes and ordinances” with the limitation that such laws be “not 
contrary to the laws and customs of our Realm of England or in prejudice of 
the Mayor of the city of London.”94 
 
88.  15 Hen. 6, c. 6, in THE STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 87, at 216. The original phrase in law 
French translates as “disloyal and little reasonable.” Id., in 2 STATUTES OF THE REALM 295, 
298-99 (photo. reprint 1993) (London, George Eyre & Andrew Strahan 1816) (describing 
“disloialx & meins resonables ordenaunces”). 
89.  BARRON, supra note 70, at 210. 
90.  See Helen Miller, London and Parliament in the Reign of Henry VIII, 35 BULL. INST. HIST. RES. 
128, 133 (1962). 
91.  WILLIAM MEADE WILLIAMS, ANNALS OF THE WORSHIPFUL COMPANY OF THE FOUNDERS OF 
THE CITY OF LONDON 9-10 (London, W.H. Boosey & Co. 1867). 
92.  BARRON, supra note 70, at 211. 
93.  2 HERBERT, supra note 73, at 157 (reproducing the Goldsmith’s Company’s patent of 1462-
1463, granting the power to “make good and reasonable by-laws and ordinances”); see 
Charter to the Ironmongers’ Company (Mar. 20, 1463), in id. at 623, 623 (requiring that 
ordinances and statutes be “convenable and nede for holsom guydyng, rewle, and 
governyng” of the freemen). 
94.  Letters Patent of Henry VII (Jan. 6, 1503), in FRY & SAYLE, supra note 66, at 33, 39; see also 
Merchant Adventurers Act, 1496, 12 Hen. 7, c. 6 (permitting Englishmen free passage to the 
Netherlands markets without exaction by the Merchant Adventurers by altering “an 
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This limit coincided with an act passed in 1504 constraining corporations.95 
Francis Bacon would later note that the desire was “to restrain the by-laws or 
ordinances of corporations, which many times were against the prerogative of 
the King, the common law of the realm, and the liberty of the subject, being 
fraternities in evil.”96 Guilds and fraternities could not make acts or ordinances 
“in disheritance or diminution of the prerogative of the King, nor of others, nor 
against the common profit of the people.”97 Ordinances were to be approved 
by the Chancellor, Treasurer, and Chief Justices or the justices of the assize.98 
This review by Crown judicial officers was taken seriously. The 
Fishmongers’ 1509 ordinances recited the Act, explained that the ordinances 
had been presented and subsequently reformed, and included the final 
certificate from Crown officers.99 Even minor companies had their ordinances 
approved.100 By the 1520s, London corporations were having ordinances “ripely 
examynd and perused and diligently correctid.”101 In 1529, the Goldsmiths’ 
Company stated that its ordinances were “approved and confirmed by the lord 
chancellor, lord treasurer, and two chief justices, according to the laws and 
constitutions of the realm.”102 Review continued into the seventeenth century. 
The Chancellor and Chief Justices approved the Musicians’ ordinances in 1606 
and the Merchant Tailors’ ordinances in 1613.103 The Haberdashers’ 1675 
ordinances were signed by the Lord Chancellor Finch, Chief Justice of King’s 
 
ordinance and constitution” that was “contrary to all law, reason, charity, right and 
conscience . . . to the prejudice of all Englishmen”) (spelling modernized). 
95.  Ordinances of Corporations Act, 1504, 19 Hen. 7, c. 7 (alternatively called “De privatis & 
illicitis statutis non faciendis”); see JOHN WHEELER, A TREATISE OF COMMERCE 30 (George 
Burton Hotchkiss ed., 1931) (1601) (noting that until Henry VII, craft guilds were “under 
the control” of the Mayor of London). 
96.  FRANCIS BACON, History of Henry VII, in THE HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF HENRY VII AND 
SELECTED WORKS 1, 181 (Brian Vickers ed., 1998). 
97.  Ordinances of Corporations Act (spelling modernized). 
98.  See id.; HAROLD J. LASKI, THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 207 (1921) 
(discussing the Act); 1 SELECT CASES BEFORE THE KING’S COUNCIL IN THE STAR CHAMBER, 
COMMONLY CALLED THE COURT OF STAR CHAMBER, at cli-cliii (I.S. Leadam ed., Selden Soc’y 
vol. 16, 1903) [hereinafter STAR CHAMBER]; Miller, supra note 90, at 138-40 (discussing 
London’s failed effort to obtain a more liberal “acte concernyng corporacions”). 
99.  2 HERBERT, supra note 73, at 32-33; see also id. at 309 (discussing the Skinners’ reformation of 
ordinances). 
100.  HAZLITT, supra note 85, at 136 (discussing the 1508 Shearmen ordinances). 
101.  Miller, supra note 90, at 141-42. 
102.  2 HERBERT, supra note 73, at 148-49; see id. at 654 (discussing the 1531 Clothworkers’ 
ordinances). 
103.  HAZLITT, supra note 85, at 569; 2 HERBERT, supra note 73, at 418. 
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Bench Matthew Hale, and Chief Justice of Common Pleas Sir Francis North.104 
As late as 1712, a corporate treatise began the chapter on “the Nature and 
Doctrine of By-Laws” with a discussion of the 1504 Act and its review 
requirement.105 
The constrained nature of corporate bylaws also arose sporadically in the 
context of ordinary litigation. Until the late sixteenth century, cases involving 
corporations arose in Star Chamber, which had “special oversight over the 
trades and other companies.”106 A 1507 complaint about price fixing under the 
Founders Fellowship’s ordinance noted the 1504 Act that limited “statutes or 
actes.”107 A 1516 case involved the Artificers’ claim that their “good and 
reasonable ordinances” had been confirmed by the Crown, yet the Mayor and 
Aldermen of Newcastle had barred them from free buying and selling.108 The 
Chancellor sitting in Exchequer also may have heard such cases. In 1508, a case 
 
104.  2 HERBERT, supra note 73, at 539. 
105.  LAWS CONCERNING TRADE, AND TRADESMEN, supra note 48, at 6-7. 
106.  CORA L. SCOFIELD, A STUDY OF THE COURT OF STAR CHAMBER 50 (1900); see also id. at 51-54. 
Because corporations were delegations of Crown prerogative, the common law courts 
initially did not hear cases involving ordinances. See MICHAEL STUCKEY, THE HIGH COURT 
OF STAR CHAMBER 33-34, 51 (1998). The sixteenth-century Star Chamber operated as a 
judicial body. See PROCEEDINGS IN THE COURT OF THE STAR CHAMBER IN THE REIGNS OF 
HENRY VII. AND HENRY VIII. 15-16 (G. Bradford ed., 1911); SCOFIELD, supra, at 26, 42. For 
cases discussing incorporated towns, see Bakers of Andover v. Knyght (Star Chamber 1534), in 
2 STAR CHAMBER, supra note 98, at 207, 215-16 (Selden Soc’y vol. 25, 1911); and Hewyt v. 
London (Star Chamber 1500), in 1 STAR CHAMBER, supra note 98, at 71, 78-79. For the usage 
of the phrase “not repugnant or contrarye” relating to a proclamation regarding 
transporting goods to Calais, see Smythe v. Danckerd (Star Chamber 1544), in 2 STAR 
CHAMBER, supra note 98, at 277, 281 (Selden Soc’y vol. 25, 1911). 
107.  Butlond v. Austen (Star Chamber 1507), in 1 STAR CHAMBER, supra note 98, at 262, 262-71; 
see also 1 STAR CHAMBER, supra note 98, at cliii. The case had first been tried by the City of 
London. An official of the company allegedly had required other members to sell to him at a 
fixed price; he justified his actions based on an “acte” of the Company. See also Excestre v. 
Stoden (Star Chamber 1477), in 1 STAR CHAMBER, supra note 98, at 1, 2 (presenting a claim 
that the Master and Wardens of Tailors under color of the King’s letters patent had acted 
“contrarie to the old libertees customes and laufull vsages” of Exeter). 
108.  Newcastle v. Artificers (Star Chamber 1516), in 2 STAR CHAMBER, supra note 98, at 75, 79, 81, 
106 (Selden Soc’y vol. 25, 1911) (spelling modernized); see also 2 STAR CHAMBER, supra note 
98, at xcvii-ci (Selden Soc’y vol. 25, 1911). The exemplification stated that the burgesses and 
inhabitants of Newcastle had “grievously and contemptuously offended the king’s grace 
contrary and against his peace[,] laws[,] and statutes.” Newcastle, in 2 STAR CHAMBER, supra 
note 98, at 116 (Selden Soc’y vol. 25, 1911) (spelling modernized). In a case involving Bristol 
that was heard around 1518, the Mayor stated that the town had “authority & power to make 
ordinances and rules for the good politic governance” of the town. Sheriff of Brystowe v. 
Mayor of Brystowe (Star Chamber c. 1518), in 2 STAR CHAMBER, supra note 98, at 142, 148 
(Selden Soc’y vol. 25, 1911) (spelling modernized). 
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explained that the Founders had “made an Acte contrary to the P’lement” and 
hoped that the Chancellor would correct “ouer Acts and Rules” so that “the 
Crafte myte be harmless agenst the Kyng our Soveryng Lord.”109 
The language used to describe this limit slowly changed during the 
sixteenth century in favor of a consistent limit framed in terms of “repugnancy” 
to national laws. Similar to early limits described above, statutes approved in 
1530 and 1536 regulating apprentices contained language that guilds and 
fraternities could not make acts or ordinances “in disinheritance or diminution 
of the prerogative of the King, nor of other, nor against the common profit of 
the people.”110 The Hospitals for the Poor Act (1597) abandoned such broad 
language: “rules, statutes, and ordinances” of “bodies politique or corporate” 
should not be “repugnant or contrary to the laws and statutes of this realm.”111 
The principle of constrained bylaw authority under this more precise 
“repugnancy” standard also appeared in the patents of the new trading 
corporations and the new charters of the livery companies. The 1505 charter of 
the Merchant Adventurers of Calais had limited the company’s lawmaking 
power by the requirement that an “Act or Statute” that was “contrary” to the 
“Crowne, Honor, Dignity Royall or Prerogative or to the deminution of the 
Commonweale of our Realme” was “of no force or effect.”112 The 1564 charter 
of the Merchant Adventurers stated the limit as “not hurtful to any [of] the 
Rights of the Crowne, honour, dignity, Royall . . . prerogative or the 
[diminution] of the Common Weale of this our Realme or contrary to any [of] 
 
109.  WILLIAMS, supra note 91, at 13. 
110.  Apprentices’ Fees Act, 1530, 22 Hen. 8, c. 4; see also Apprentices Act, 1536, 28 Hen. 8, c. 5 
(employing similar language). These acts were also subject to the same review structure. See 
also Leases by Corporations Act, 1541, 33 Hen. 8, c. 27 (making void acts or orders by a 
founder of a corporation that permitted a single person to veto a grant authorized by the 
majority “contrary to the form, order, and course of the common law”). 
111.  Hospitals for the Poor Act, 1597, 39 Eliz., c. 5; see SHEPHEARD, supra note 46, at 31 (noting 
the statute). For later examples, see Hackney Coaches, etc. Act, 1715, 1 Geo., c. 57, which 
granted commissioners the power to make orders, bylaws and ordinances so long as they 
did not contain anything “repugnant to the Laws of this Realm”; Stamps Act, 1710, 9 Ann., 
c. 23, § 16; and Hackney Coaches, etc. Act, 1694, 5 & 6 W. & M., c. 22. See also Stourbridge 
Canal. Act, 1776, 16 Geo. 3, c. 28, § 46; East India Company Act, 1772, 13 Geo. 3, c. 63, § 36; 
Isle of Man Harbours Act, 1771, 11 Geo. 3, c. 52. 
112.  Patent of Henry VII to the Merchant Adventurers at Calais (Sept. 28, 1505), in GEORGE 
CAWSTON & A.H. KEANE, THE EARLY CHARTERED COMPANIES (A.D. 1296-1858) app. II, at 
249, 252-53 (photo. reprint 2002) (London, E. Arnold 1896). On the London livery 
companies and the Merchant Adventurers, see E.M. Carus-Wilson, The Origins and Early 
Development of the Merchant Adventurers’ Organization in London as Shown in Their Own 
Mediaeval Records, 4 ECON. HIST. REV. 147 (1933). See also Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Historical 
and Political Origins of the Corporate Board of Directors, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 89, 125-26 (2004). 
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our Lawes & Statutes.”113 By 1579, the charter of the Eastland Merchants 
provided that the governor could make such “good statutes lawes 
constitutcyons and ordinaunces for the good government and rule” of the 
fellowship as was thought “mete and convenyente” as long as they were “not 
repugnante or derogatorie to the lawes and statutes of this Realme of 
Englande” or contrary to any treaty.114 The 1600 Levant Company charter 
required that “the said laws . . . be reasonable and not contrary or 
repugnant.”115 The 1607 charter of the Drapers’ Company similarly stated that 
“laws, statutes, ordinances, constitutions, imprisonments, fines, and 
amerciaments shall be reasonable, and shall not be contrary or repugnant to the 
laws, statutes, customs, or rights of our kingdom of England.”116 A 
contemporary publication of the Worshipful Company of Shipwrights 
included the Company’s 1612 charter, which contained a repugnancy clause; 
the Company’s acts and ordinances; and the confirmation by Thomas 
Ellesmere, Thomas Fleming, and Edward Coke that the ordinances had been 
 
113.  Charter of Queen Elizabeth (July 18, 1564), in CAWSTON & KEANE, supra note 112, app. II, at 
254, 268. 
114.  THE ACTS AND ORDINANCES OF THE EASTLAND COMPANY 145 (Maud Sellers ed., 1906). 
115.  Charter to the Levant Company, Patent Rolls, 43 Eliz., pt. v (1600), in SELECT CHARTERS OF 
TRADING COMPANIES, A.D. 1530-1707, at 30, 34 (Cecil T. Carr ed., 1913). 
116.  Of a Grant to Them and Their Successors for the Drapers of the City of London (Jan. 19, 
1607), in 1 HERBERT, supra note 73, at 485, 490; see 2 HERBERT, supra note 73, at 317 
(noting that the Skinners’ charter was limited in some respects by reasonableness and 
repugnancy); Charter to the Men of the Mystery of Fishmongers of the City of London, 
to Them and Their Successors (Oct. 6, 1559), in id. at 116, 117 (noting that the 
Fishmongers’ letters patent did not give the power to make “any ordinances or statutes in 
prejudice of us or our people”); Of a Grant to Them and Their Successors for the Mystery 
of Grocers of London (Apr. 15, 1639), in 1 HERBERT, supra note 73, at 368, 372 (providing 
in the Grocers’ charter that the “laws, statutes, [and] constitutions . . . shall be 
reasonable, and shall not be contrary nor repugnant to the laws, statutes, customs, or 
rights of our kingdom of England”); see also WILLIAMS, supra note 91, at 23 (describing 
the 1613 authorization of the Masters and Wardens of the Mystery of the Company of 
Founders “to make orders and ordenances for the good government of the said Mysterie, 
so as they be not repugnant to the lawes of the land, nor against the freedom and liberties 
of this Citty”); Charter of Maidstone (1603), in WILLIAM ROBERTS JAMES, THE CHARTERS 
AND OTHER DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE KING’S TOWN AND PARISH OF MAIDSTONE IN 
THE COUNTY OF KENT 72 (London, Joseph Butterworth & Son 1825) (requiring that “laws, 
ordinances, constitutions, imprisonments, fines, and amerciaments be reasonable, and 
not repugnant nor contrary to the laws, statutes, customs or rights of our kingdom of 
England”). 
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reviewed and were lawful.117 Repugnancy to the laws of the realm, the 
kingdom, eventually the nation, had become the standard. 
C. Constitutional Limits on Corporate Bylaws 
At the end of the sixteenth century, the common law courts began an 
extensive discussion of the limits on corporate bylaw authority.118 At least six 
reported cases can be found addressing the issue: The Chamberlain of London’s 
Case (1590); Doggerell v. Pokes (1595); Bab v. Clerk (1595); Wilford v. Masham 
(1595); Clark’s Case (1596); and Davenant v. Hurdis (1599).119 These cases were 
followed by others, including Dr. Bonham’s Case (1608).120 A clear principle 
arose from the cases: corporate bylaws could not be repugnant to the “Lawes of 
the Nation.”121 Although the principle was not explicitly labeled as 
constitutional, in substance it appeared to be. The granting authority could not 
authorize a bylaw or charter provision in violation of the limits.122 
 
117.  [CHARTER TO SHIPWRIGHTS COMPANY] 21, 44-71 (London, T. Dawson c. 1612), available at 
http://eebo.chadwyck.com/search (search for “Shipwrights Company”). 
118.  Jurisdiction over companies and corporations passed from Star Chamber. On the change in 
jurisdiction, see Barbara Malament, The “Economic Liberalism” of Sir Edward Coke, 76 YALE 
L.J. 1321, 1340 (1967). 
119.  Davenant v. Hurdis, (1599) 72 Eng. Rep. 769 (K.B.); Clark’s Case, (1596) 77 Eng. Rep. 152 
(C.P.); Wilford v. Masham, (1595) 72 Eng. Rep. 657 (K.B.); Bab v. Clerk, (1595) 72 Eng. 
Rep. 663 (K.B.); Doggerell v. Pokes, (1595) 72 Eng. Rep. 663 (K.B.); The Chamberlain of 
London’s Case, (1590) 77 Eng. Rep. 150 (K.B.). For unpublished cases addressing limits on 
corporate bylaws, see Hays v. Harding, (1656) 145 Eng. Rep. 376, 378 (Exch.). 
120.  (1608) 77 Eng. Rep. 638 (C.P.); see also Dr. Bonham’s Case, (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (K.B.). 
121.  SHEPHEARD, supra note 46, at 82. 
122.  See Norris v. Staps, (1616) 80 Eng. Rep. 357, 358 (K.B.) (“And if the King in his letters 
patent of Incorporation do make ordinances himself . . . yet they are also subject to the 
same rule of law . . . .”); SHEPHEARD, supra note 46, at 43 (“There are some things often 
inserted in these Charters that are unlawfull . . . .”); id. at 51 (“[T]he Lo. Pro. cannot 
extend it to prejudice any other man’s interest . . . .”); id. at 68-69, 73, 76-80 (discussing 
things that could not be done in a charter); id. at 84 (“No Clause in the Charter . . . can 
help or make such an Ordinance good.”). The issue of whether Parliament could 
authorize a violation was not expressly discussed by Shepheard, likely because few 
charters had been given by Parliament. See SHEPHEARD, supra note 46, at 7-8, 105 
(discussing Parliament). Later corporate treatises also did not explicitly address the 
question. One instance, however, in which later treatise writers suggested that Parliament 
might be capable of authorizing otherwise void bylaws involved the problematic area of 
ancient customs. On the one hand, a 1712 corporate treatise declared that “all By-Laws . . . 
made against the Liberty and Freedom of the People . . . are void.” LAWS CONCERNING 
TRADE, AND TRADESMEN, supra note 48, at 10. On the other hand, it added that 
immemorial custom and prescription in London and other corporations might permit a 
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In 1605, Edward Coke’s new volume of Reports included five reports under 
the heading “Cases of By-Laws and Ordinances.”123 Coke’s interest in 
corporations and bylaws was not surprising. He had served as a recorder for 
Coventry (1585), Norwich (1586), and London (1592),124 handling litigation for 
towns and serving “as the officer principally charged with knowing, 
interpreting, and applying the law of the land.”125 He had a lengthy 
relationship with the Drapers’ Company. He also had represented and 
investigated other London guilds, towns, and trading corporations. As Chief 
Justice, he had ratified ordinances for various guilds, including the Merchant 
Tailors.126 
Coke’s section on bylaws played a crucial role in restating and publicizing 
constitutional limits on corporate ordinances.127 The first case, The Chamberlain 
 
corporation to “justify the doing of some Things against common Right.” Id. at 12. The 
only example involved regulating the sale of goods by a foreigner within the city. Cities 
that had been incorporated within the time of memory could only gain such a privilege by 
Parliament. Id. These customary privileges, however, were limited in scope. See id. at 19-
20. Because modern constitutional theory thinks about “constitutional” limitations in a 
precise and technical manner arising from distinctions developed after the creation of 
written constitutions, it is difficult to conclude whether this limitation was “constitutional” 
in the modern sense of that term. 
123.  EDWARD COKE, THE FIFT PART OF THE REPORTS OF SR. EDWARD COKE KNIGHT, THE KINGS 
ATTORNEY GENERALL fols. 62v-68v (London, Co. of Stationers 1612) (describing “Cases de 
Bilawes & ordinances”); see S.E. Thorne, Prof. of Legal History, Harvard Univ., Sir Edward 
Coke, 1552-1952, Address to the Selden Society (Mar. 17, 1952), in S.E. THORNE, SIR EDWARD 
COKE, 1552-1952, at 3, 10-12 (1957), reprinted in ESSAYS IN ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY, supra 
note 41, at 223, 230-32. The cases were The Chamberlain of London’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 150; 
Clark’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 152; Jeffrey’s Case, (1589) 77 Eng. Rep. 153 (C.P.), which 
concerned whether a person who owned land in a parish but lived elsewhere had to pay as a 
parishioner; Jeffrey’s Case, (1589) 77 Eng. Rep. 155 (K.B.), on the same topic; and The Lord 
Cheyney’s Case, (1591) 77 Eng. Rep. 158 (Ct. Wards), which concerned wills. 
124.  1 JOHN CAMPBELL, THE LIVES OF THE CHIEF JUSTICES OF ENGLAND 252 (Jersey City, Fred. D. 
Linn & Co. 1881) (1849). 
125.  TITTLER, supra note 59, at 227. 
126.  See ALLEN D. BOYER, SIR EDWARD COKE AND THE ELIZABETHAN AGE 46 (2003); HASTINGS 
LYON & HERMAN BLOCK, EDWARD COKE: ORACLE OF THE LAW 57-58 (photo. reprint 1992) 
(1929); STEPHEN D. WHITE, SIR EDWARD COKE AND “THE GRIEVANCES OF THE 
COMMONWEALTH,” 1621-1628 app. B, at 284-88 (1979). 
127.  Sir Thomas Egerton, Lord Ellesmere, argued that Coke’s reports of Clark’s Case, Darcy’s 
Case, Dr. Bonham’s Case, and the Tailors of Ipswich’s Case weakened the authority of 
corporations. See LOUIS A. KNAFLA, LAW AND POLITICS IN JACOBEAN ENGLAND: THE TRACTS 
OF LORD CHANCELLOR ELLESMERE 148-54 (1977); The Lord Chancellor Egertons 
Observacions upon ye Lord Cookes Reportes (1615) [hereinafter Ellesmere], in id. at 297, 
309. 
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of London’s Case (1590), described the “contrary and repugnant” limit.128 The 
case addressed whether London could “make laws and ordinances” that 
required all cloth sold in London to be brought first to Blackwell-hall and a fee 
paid. The Chamberlain had sued certain defendants in debt for the penalties. 
The King’s Bench approved of the ordinance. Coke’s report noted that “[i]t 
appears by many precedents” that London had been given the power to “make 
ordinances and constitutions for the good order and government of the 
citizens, &c. consonant to law and reason.” All “ordinances, constitutions, or 
by-laws” that “are contrary or repugnant to the laws or statutes of the realm are 
void and of no effect.”129 
The principle that corporate bylaws were constrained by the laws of the 
realm was reinforced and expanded in the brief case that followed. Clark’s Case 
(1596) involved one Clark, who was imprisoned under a bylaw of St. Albans, a 
town incorporated under a Crown patent. The bylaw required that inhabitants 
be taxed to support the courts and provided that they could be imprisoned for 
refusing to pay.130 The court decided that the ordinance was against chapter 29 
of Magna Carta.131 While a corporate town could impose a “reasonable 
penalty”—for example, an action of debt or distress—imprisonment violated 
Magna Carta. Such a bylaw was, in essence, void.132 
 
128.  77 Eng. Rep. at 151. This author has not examined Coke’s original notes of the case. 
129.  Id. 
130.  Clark’s Case, (1596) 77 Eng. Rep. 152 (C.P.); see Langham’s Case, (1642) 82 Eng. Rep. 465, 
468 (K.B.) (citing Clark’s Case for the principle that “a constitution cannot be made by a 
corporation, who have power to make by-laws upon pain of imprisonment; because it is 
against the Statute of Magna Charta”); The Case of the City of London, (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 
658, 667 (K.B.) (citing Clark’s Case for the principle that “a constitution cannot be made on 
pain [of] imprisonment”). Ellesmere criticized the report: 
If there were such a judgment it were fitter to have lain silent than to have seen 
light; for the assessment being in advancement of the general justice of the realm, 
and the ordinance being in furtherance therof, the Statute of Magna Charta never 
meant to protect such obstinate persons as should refuse to set forward the 
erection of the Court of Justice. 
Ellesmere, supra note 127, at 309 (spelling modernized). Coke later addressed this issue in a 
1621 debate over the corporate imprisonment power. See 3 THE SELECTED WRITINGS OF SIR 
EDWARD COKE 1211 (Steve Sheppard ed., 2003) (quoting a speech given by Coke in 
Parliament). 
131.  Chapter 29 of the Magna Carta of 1225—chapter 39 of the 1215 charter—stated: “[N]o free 
man shall be taken or imprisoned . . . or in any way destroyed . . . except by the lawful 
judgment of his peers or by the law of the land.” J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH 
LEGAL HISTORY 537 (3d ed. 1990). 
132.  Clark’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 152. 
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The bylaw cases not reported by Coke reflect similar constitutional 
constraints. In Doggerell v. Pokes (1595), a London bylaw made the bonds and 
covenants of an apprentice void if he was the son of an alien; the court 
concluded that the bylaw could not void the covenant but could only impose a 
fine.133 Bab v. Clerk (1595) involved imprisonment under the bylaw of an 
incorporated town. Once again, the court found the imprisonment unjustified 
and the bylaw unlawful.134 In Wilford v. Masham (1595), a London bylaw 
barred apothecaries from selling unwholesome drugs on pain of forfeit; the 
court concluded in favor of the bylaws and customs.135 Bylaws could penalize 
by fine or debt, but not by imprisonment. 
Another case unreported in Coke’s 1605 Reports, Davenant v. Hurdis 
(1599),136 confirmed the principle of limited bylaws; Francis Moore included 
the case in his reports under the heading “By lawes de Corporations.”137 The 
Merchant Tailors had the power to make ordinances “for their good 
governance” provided they were “not contrary to the laws and constitutions of 
the king, nor in prejudice to the majority of citizens of London.”138 The 
ordinance required Merchant Tailors to use another member of the Merchant 
Tailors in working half of the cloth, and Davenant refused either to comply or 
 
133.  (1595) 72 Eng. Rep. 663 (K.B.) (law French); WILLIAM HUGHES, AN EXACT ABRIDGEMENT IN 
ENGLISH, OF THE CASES REPORTED BY SR. FRANCIS MORE KT. 118 (London, John Starkey, 
Thomas Basset & Samuel Speed 1665) (English version). For an early bylaw case, see 
Scarling v. Criett, (1565) 72 Eng. Rep. 451 (K.B.), which required that the major portion of 
inhabitants participate in bylaws. 
134.  Bab v. Clerk, (1595) 72 Eng. Rep. 663 (K.B.) (law French); HUGHES, supra note 133, at 118 
(English version). The court suggested that disenfranchisement would have been 
permissible. Lawful appears as “loyal” in Francis Moore’s report. Bab, 72 Eng. Rep. at 663. 
135.  (1595) 72 Eng. Rep. 657 (K.B.) (law French); HUGHES, supra note 133, at 113 (English 
version). 
136.  (1599) 72 Eng. Rep. 769 (K.B.). 
137.  FRANCIS MOORE, CASES COLLECT & REPORT 576 (London, G. Paulet 1688). Davenant is 
usually discussed with respect to monopolies. See, e.g., Malament, supra note 118; David 
Harris Sacks, The Countervailing of Benefits: Monopoly, Liberty, and Benevolence in Elizabethan 
England, in TUDOR POLITICAL CULTURE 272 (Dale Hoak ed., 1995); Donald O. Wagner, The 
Common Law and Free Enterprise: An Early Case of Monopoly, 7 ECON. HIST. REV. 217 (1937); 
see also Michael Conant, Antimonopoly Tradition Under the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments: 
Slaughter-House Cases Re-Examined, 31 EMORY L.J. 785, 794-95 (1982); Bernard H. Siegan, 
Protecting Economic Liberties, 6 CHAP. L. REV. 43, 51-54 (2003). 
138.  Davenant, 72 Eng. Rep. at 770 (author’s translation). The Merchant Tailors’ ordinances had 
been confirmed by the Treasurer and the two Chief Justices. Id. My thanks to David Seipp 
for assistance with the translation. 
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to pay the fine. The company sent Hurdis to enter Davenant’s house and seize 
the cloth.139 
The later English abridger, William Hughes, commented that the “Case 
was very long and very Learnedly argued.”140 As counsel for Davenant, Coke 
contended that the ordinance was unreasonable and void. It was a monopoly 
and “against common right, and against the nature of a bylaw, because a bylaw 
ought to be made in furtherance of the public good and the better execution of 
the laws, and not in utter prejudice of subjects or for private gain.”141 Coke 
cited several other cases in which corporate ordinances were judged against the 
common good or Magna Carta.142 Defending Hurdis, Moore accepted that 
bylaws against law and “common equity” were unreasonable; however, he 
insisted that reasonable customs for particular places should be upheld because 
the “same reasoning that appoints general laws to govern kingdoms ought to 
allow particular laws to govern particular societies.”143 Moore pointed out that 
regional inheritance customs (borough English and gavelkind) were permitted 
by reasons of the place and people, although against the common law (which 
required primogeniture).144 The court sided with Davenant. The bylaw created 
a monopoly and was “against law.”145 In a later case, Coke described Davenant 
as demonstrating that the ordinances had to be “consonant to law and reason” 
and not “against the common law, because it was against the liberty of the 
subject.”146 
 
139.  Id. at 769-70. 
140.  HUGHES, supra note 133, at 164. 
141.  Davenant, 72 Eng. Rep. at 771 (author’s translation) (stating in the original “que est encount 
common droit, & encount le nature dun by-law: car by-law doit estre fait en furtherace del publick 
bone et le melior execution des leys, et nemy en ouster p[re]judice des subjects ou pur private gain”). 
142.  Id. at 771-72; MOORE, supra note 137, at 580. 
143.  Davenant, 72 Eng. Rep. at 773 (author’s translation) (stating in the original “dont ensuist que 
m[eme] le reason que appoint general leys de governer kingdomes doit allower particular leys pur 
governer particular societies”). 
144.  Id. at 776; MOORE, supra note 137, at 588. Coke argued that the ordinance was “repugnant”; 
however, he appeared to be emphasizing inconsistency rather than contrariness. See 
Davenant, 72 Eng. Rep. at 771; MOORE, supra note 137, at 578. For a similar argument about 
divergences based on custom, see Wardens & Corp. of Weavers in London v. Brown, (1601) 78 
Eng. Rep. 1031 (Q.B.). 
145.  Davenant, 72 Eng. Rep. at 778; MOORE, supra note 137, at 591; see also HUGHES, supra note 
133, at 164 (describing the ordinance as “against the Common Law, because it was against 
the Liberty of the Subject”). 
146.  The Case of Monopolies, (1602) 77 Eng. Rep. 1260, 1263, 1266 (K.B.) (reporting that the 
grant by letters patent of an exclusive right to import and sell playing cards was found void 
as a “monopoly against the common law”). Other reports of the case did not emphasize 
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In the decade following his published discussion of bylaws, Coke continued 
to emphasize the legal limitations on corporate ordinances. In this context, he 
decided Dr. Bonham’s Case (1608),147 which made increasingly apparent the 
constitutional nature of the limit. The College of Physicians had imprisoned 
Thomas Bonham, a Doctor of Physic from the University of Cambridge, after 
concluding that he had continued to practice medicine in London despite 
having not been admitted to the College and having been found “less sufficient 
and unskilful to administer physic.”148 The College defended its actions as 
justified by the charter of incorporation and by statutes confirming the charter 
and discussing imprisonment.149 Chief Justice Coke, a Cambridge graduate, 
disagreed.150 The College could not imprison Bonham. 
The case was thus about corporate authority. Sir Thomas Egerton, Lord 
Ellesmere, declared as much when he commented that Coke’s report struck “in 
sunder the Barrs of Governement” of the corporation.151 The decision flowed 
from Clark’s Case, although it involved the complication of the confirmatory 
parliamentary statute instead of simply the original letters patent.152 Coke was 
not much more sympathetic to a corporation claiming imprisonment authority 
under confirmatory parliamentary statute than he was to one claiming such 
 
Davenant. Darcy v. Allin, (1602) 74 Eng. Rep. 1131 (K.B.); Darcy v. Allen, (1602) 72 Eng. 
Rep. 830 (K.B.). See generally Jacob I. Corré, The Argument, Decision, and Reports of Darcy v. 
Allen, 45 EMORY L.J. 1261 (1996) (discussing Darcy); D. Seaborne Davies, Further Light on 
the Case of Monopolies, 48 LAW Q. REV. 394 (1932) (same). 
147.  (1608) 77 Eng. Rep. 638 (C.P.); see also Dr. Bonham’s Case, (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (K.B.). 
148.  Dr. Bonham’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 642. 
149.  The Physicians Act confirmed the original charter of incorporation from Henry VIII. 
Physicians Act, 1523, 14 & 15 Hen. 8, c. 5. A second act discussed procedures for whenever the 
College committed persons to imprisonment but interestingly did not appear to newly 
authorize imprisonment. College of Physicians Act, 1553, 1 Mary, 2d sess., c. 9, § 4; see Dr. 
Bonham’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 656 (discussing this point). 
150.  1 GEORGE CLARK, A HISTORY OF THE ROYAL COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS OF LONDON 212 (1964). 
151.  Ellesmere, supra note 127, at 317. Ellesmere’s more oft-cited comment on Dr. Bonham’s Case 
criticized Coke’s statement about the common law as derogating from the power of 
Parliament. Id. at 306-07. Samuel Thorne’s interpretation of the Ellesmere-Coke debate 
focused on repugnancy, with Ellesmere arguing for “impossibilities or direct repugnances,” 
while Coke contemplated indirect repugnancies, “that is, contradictions not on the statute’s 
face.” Thorne, Dr. Bonham’s Case, supra note 41, at 552, reprinted in ESSAYS IN ENGLISH 
LEGAL HISTORY, supra note 41, at 278. 
152.  See Harold J. Cook, Against Common Right and Reason: The College of Physicians Versus Dr. 
Thomas Bonham, 29 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 301, 303-04 (1985) (pointing out that the College 
was “an odd corporation juridically”). Coke’s decision referred to the “Act of 14 H. 8” but 
focused on the clauses that appeared in the original letters patent reproduced in the 
preamble to the Act. Physicians Act, pmbl., cls. 13-14; see Dr. Bonham’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 
655-56. 
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authority pursuant solely to royal letters patent. As Harold Cook wrote, 
“Coke’s view of the case stemmed from a sense that an injustice had been done 
in creating a corporation with powers such as the College.”153 Although the 
opinion never confronted the ways in which parliamentary confirmation might 
alter corporate authority to imprison, Coke’s opinion offered a variety of 
alternative arguments to reach the same result achieved in his earlier corporate 
cases.154 Indeed, his statement that the common law controlled when an act of 
Parliament was against “common right and reason, or repugnant, or 
impossible to be performed” was notably similar to the language he had used 
in his 1605 reports describing limits on corporate ordinances.155 His inclination 
to doubt that corporate authority could permit imprisonment reappeared in his 
observations for the “better direction” of the college in which he emphasized 
fines over imprisonment.156 
Coke’s decisions continued to uphold national constraints on corporate 
lawmaking. In 1610, Coke stated that a “constitution” or ordinance “cannot be 
made on pain o[f] imprisonment”; it had to be on “a reasonable pecuniary 
pain, or not at all.”157 In 1612, Coke described the incidents of a corporation as 
including the power to “make ordinances; that is requisite for the good order 
and government.”158 That same year, he declared that a bylaw could not 
 
153.  Cook, supra note 152, at 319. 
154.  On Coke’s distinction between imprisonment for unauthorized practice as opposed to 
malpractice, see id. at 316. For the suggestion that the iudex in propria causa principle had its 
origins in “keeping subordinate judges to the proprieties of judicature”—in short, that it 
involved ideas about the proper scope of delegated authority—see D.C.E. Yale, Iudex in 
Propia Causa: An Historical Excursus, 33 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 80, 83, 95-96 (1974). 
155.  The similarity between Coke’s approach to limits on corporate ordinances and 
parliamentary acts appears also in Rowles v. Mason, (1612) 123 Eng. Rep. 892, 895 (C.P.), 
which held that “if there be repugnancy in statute; or unreasonableness in custom, the 
common law disallows and rejects it, as it appears by Doctor Bonham’s case.” See also Thorne, 
Dr. Bonham’s Case, supra note 41, at 549-50, reprinted in ESSAYS IN ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY, 
supra note 41, at 275-76 (discussing the use of repugnancy in statutory interpretation and in 
Rowles). 
156.  Dr. Bonham’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 657. 
157.  The Case of the City of London, (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 658, 667 (K.B.). A later commentator 
noted that “although the law has been broadly laid down by Sir Edward Coke and other 
judges, that a bye-law cannot imprison, yet the crown at all periods . . . was in the habit of 
granting the power in its charters not only to municipal but to trade[] corporations.” 
GRANT, supra note 50, at 86 (footnote omitted). 
158.  The Case of Sutton’s Hospital, (1612) 77 Eng. Rep. 937, 971 (K.B.) (citation omitted); see 
also R v. Tooley, (1613) 80 Eng. Rep. 1055 (K.B.) (discussing the custom of London, the 
common law, and Magna Carta). Shepheard emphasized that the act of Parliament 
constituting Sutton’s Hospital gave authority to “make Ordinances for Government thereof, 
not Repugnant to the Lawes in force.” SHEPHEARD, supra note 46, at 25. 
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abridge or restrain the liberty of the subject.159 In 1614, Coke addressed the 
consequence of approval under the 1504 corporate review act, an issue that had 
not previously arisen. He concluded that review under the statute did not 
insulate the bylaws from judicial review. The ordinances were still to “be 
affirmed as good, or disaffirmed as unlawful by the law.”160 The ordinance at 
issue was “against the common law, and the commonwealth.”161 The courts 
seemed the ultimate decision-makers of legal corporate authority. 
In 1616, over twenty-five years after the courts had begun to describe 
corporate limits, Chief Justice Hobart affirmed these principles as inherent in 
the very nature of the English corporation. Norris v. Staps (1616) addressed the 
patent of the Weavers of Newbury.162 They had power to “make laws and 
ordinances agreeable to reason, and not in any wise contrary and repugnant to 
the laws and statutes of the realm.”163 Hobart declared that while the “power to 
make laws” was inherent in incorporations because “the body corporate must 
have laws as a politick reason to govern it,” the corporation’s laws were also 
inherently “ever . . . subject to the general law of the realm as subordinate to 
it.”164 The principle of corporate limitation thus arose from national law. 
Hobart noted that if there were “no proviso for that purpose, the law [would] 
suppl[y] it.” Corporate lawmaking authority was necessarily constrained by 
the laws of the realm.165 
 
159.  See Gravesend Case, (1612) 123 Eng. Rep. 883, 885 (C.P.) (involving certain bylaws and 
concluding that the “custom, and the patent are repugnant”); see also James Bagg’s Case, 
(1615) 77 Eng. Rep. 1271, 1279-80 (K.B.) (addressing disenfranchisement and concluding 
that the corporation had proceeded without notice or hearing and therefore that the 
“removal is against justice and right”). 
160.  The Case of the Tailors, &c. of Ipswich, (1614) 77 Eng. Rep. 1218, 1220 (K.B.). 
161.  Id. 
162.  (1616) 80 Eng. Rep. 357 (K.B.); see also Norris v. Stapes, (1616) 123 Eng. Rep. 1060, 1061 
(C.P.) (stating that the court did not deliver an opinion as to the “principal point of making 
such a restraining ordinance”); Norris & Trussel’s Case, (1616) 123 Eng. Rep. 657 (C.P.) 
(concerning a claim that the “constitution was against law”); In re Weavers of Newbery, 
(n.d.) 72 Eng. Rep. 962, 962 (K.B.) (reporting that “le by-law fuit encounter reason”); 
HUGHES, supra note 133, at 260. 
163.  Norris, 123 Eng. Rep. at 1060; see SHEPHEARD, supra note 46, at 98-104 (discussing Norris). 
The ordinance required service as an apprentice before serving as a weaver. The Weavers 
had sought refuge in the review approval given to their ordinances under the 1504 Act. 
Hobart declared that the ordinance was “absurd” due to its exclusion of apprentices raised in 
the town. Norris, 80 Eng. Rep. at 358. 
164.  Norris, 80 Eng. Rep. at 358. 
165.  Id. 
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Shepheard’s 1659 treatise codified these principles. The section “What 
Ordinances a Corporation May Make” stated that they were not to be 
“repugnant to the Lawes of the Nation, against the publick and common good 
of the people within or without the same City.”166 A suggested form was “to 
make Lawes, Orders, Ordinances, and Constitutions . . . as to them shall seeme 
necessary, and convenient (not repugnant to the prerogative of Us or our 
Successors, or to any of the Statutes, or other [of] the Lawes of England).”167 
The clause “they may not make Ordinances repugnant to the Lawes, &c.,” 
however, did not need to be in the charter or act of incorporation; it was “idle, 
and to no purpose,” because “such By-lawes made by a Corporation, are void 
by the very Common-Law.”168 Case after case demonstrated “unlawfull” and 
“void” corporate ordinances169: imprisoning people; requiring the forfeiture of 
goods; restraining the liberty of trade or the common liberty of the subject; 
creating justices of the peace or criminal courts; pardoning felons; and 
enrolling deeds.170 
By the time that English corporations began to settle North America, 
English law had developed a well-established practice of voiding corporate 
ordinances that were repugnant to the laws of the nation. The principle of 
repugnancy was mediated in certain instances by permitting contrary corporate 
bylaws when they rested on immemorial custom.171 Corporate ordinances were 
to be reviewed in advance by judges but could be challenged in the courts. “As 
between the particular privileges of towns and companies and the interests of 
the whole realm in trade legal opinion went against the exclusive privileges of 
 
166.  SHEPHEARD, supra note 46, at 82. Shepheard noted that “Custome or Prescription justifie the 
doing of some things against common Right” in London. Id. at 86. 
167.  THE FORMES AND PRESIDENTS OF CHARTERS; CONCERNING CORPORATIONS. WITH THE 
CHIEF MATTERS THAT ARE USUALLY CONTAINED IN THEM (London, J. Streater 1659), 
reprinted in SHEPHEARD, supra note 46, at 131, 147; see also id., reprinted in SHEPHEARD, supra 
note 46, at 178 (reproducing another charter with the phrase “reasonable . . . and not 
repugnant to the Laws, Liberties, Rights, Customs, and Statutes of England”). 
168.  SHEPHEARD, supra note 46, at 82. Shepheard stated that bylaws not against the prerogative 
of the Lord Protector or profit of the people were good “without any . . . Confirmation” 
under the 1504 Act. Id. at 83. Confirmation could not, however, make good certain 
ordinances that were otherwise void. See id. at 83-84. 
169.  Id. at 43, 78-79. 
170.  Id. at 43, 71-73, 78-79, 84. Shepheard treated Dr. Bonham’s Case as a corporate case, resolving 
that the College had “no power to punish by Fine and Imprisonment, those who practice 
without their License, but those practisers who mis-administer Physick”—or, if it did have 
such power, it had “not pursued it according to the Statute and Patent.” Id. at 104-05. 
171.  COOKE, supra note 65, at 64. 
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the corporation.”172 Repugnancy, together with the principle of limited 
corporate lawmaking, did not lie in the particular words of a Crown grant but 
was inherent in the essence of legitimate English government. It was, in short, 
a constitutional principle. 
ii. repugnancy,  colonial law, and the constitution 
This corporate practice became the American practice later known as 
judicial review. During the colonial period, the limit on corporate bylaws 
became a limit on colonial legislatures enforced by colonial courts and the Privy 
Council. Between 1776 and 1787, state constitutions and state judicial practice 
continued to assume that legislation could not be repugnant to new written 
constitutions. The Framers of the U.S. Constitution, Federalists and Anti-
Federalists, federal judges, and Supreme Court Justices made the same 
assumption. 
A. The Colonial Constitution and Repugnancy 
English colonization efforts absorbed the idea of constrained corporate 
bylaws. The Crown delegated governance authority over settlements through 
letters patent.173 The nature of the political entity that would hold the authority 
changed over the course of early English settlement. Initial settlements in 
Virginia and Massachusetts Bay, among others, were structured as 
corporations. The use of the corporate form is not surprising given the overlap 
between members of London companies and colonial ventures. Indeed, a 
number of London aldermen and merchants had significant involvement in 
domestic and foreign trading corporations.174 Members of the London livery 
companies and trading companies were major participants in the new North 
 
172.  Id; see 3 E. LIPSON, THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF ENGLAND 348-50 (6th ed. 1956) (describing 
the courts’ hostility to monopolies and privileges). The 1624 Statute of Monopolies, barring 
certain grants of monopoly, exempted corporate charters and thus produced an increase in 
incorporations. See Statute of Monopolies, 1624, 21 Jac., c. 3, §§ 1, 9; ROBERT ASHTON, THE 
CITY AND THE COURT, 1603-1643, at 118 (1979); COOKE, supra note 65, at 55. 
173.  See Mary Sarah Bilder, English Settlement and Local Governance, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY 
OF LAW IN AMERICA (Christopher L. Tomlins & Michael Grossberg eds., forthcoming 2007). 
174.  See ASHTON, supra note 172, at 34-42; ROBERT BRENNER, MERCHANTS AND REVOLUTION: 
COMMERCIAL CHANGE, POLITICAL CONFLICT, AND LONDON’S OVERSEAS TRADERS, 1550-1653, 
at 92-112 (1993) (discussing the company merchants’ relationship to colonial development). 
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American settlement ventures; Edward Coke, for example, was involved in the 
Virginia Company.175 
The constraints on settlement governance authority were clarified as 
domestic corporate bylaw constraints became more apparent in the late 
sixteenth century. The letters patent given to John Cabot in 1496 and to Bristol 
merchants in 1501 granted governance authority but contained no explicit 
limits.176 By 1569, however, the company formed by Humphrey Gilbert to 
create English settlements in Munster, Ireland, adopted corporate governance 
practices and limits. Gilbert requested that the head of his company hold the 
power to make “laws and ordinances, not contrary to the laws of Ireland.”177 In 
later patents in the 1570s to Gilbert and to his half-brother Walter Raleigh, 
lawmaking authority was constrained by the requirement that it “be as neere as 
conveniently may, agreeable to the forme of the lawes & pollicy of England.”178 
In the wake of the common law court decisions regarding the repugnancy 
principle for domestic corporations, letters patent for settlement corporations 
began to use the terms “contrary” or “repugnant” with regard to the laws of 
England. The 1611 Virginia charter required that the laws “be not contrary.”179 
The 1620 New England charter conferred the power to make laws “so always as 
the same be not contrary” and declared that such laws should be “as near as 
 
175.  Thorne, supra note 123, reprinted in ESSAYS IN ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY, supra note 41, at 225. 
176.  Letters Patent for Richarde Warde, Thomas Asshehurst, John Thomas, João Fernandes, 
Francisco Fernandes, and João Gonsalves (Mar. 19, 1501), in AMERICA FROM CONCEPT TO 
DISCOVERY: EARLY EXPLORATION OF NORTH AMERICA 104, 105 (David B. Quinn ed., New 
Am. World vol. 1, 1979); Letters Patent Granted to John Cabot and His Sons (Mar. 5, 1496), 
in AMERICA FROM CONCEPT TO DISCOVERY, supra, at 94, 95; see also Charter to Sir Walter 
Raleigh (1584), in 1 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND 
OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE 
FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 53, 55 (photo. reprint 1993) (Francis Newton 
Thorpe ed., 1909) [hereinafter FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS]; Letters Patent to 
Hugh Elyot, Thomas Asshehurst, João Gonsalves, and Francisco Fernandes (Dec. 9, 1502), 
in AMERICA FROM CONCEPT TO DISCOVERY, supra, at 111, 111. 
177.  2 THE VOYAGES AND COLONISING ENTERPRISES OF SIR HUMPHREY GILBERT 493 (David Beers 
Quinn ed., Hakluyt Soc’y 2d ser. 84, 1940). 
178.  Letters Patent to Sir Humfrey Gylberte (June 11, 1578), in 1 FEDERAL AND STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 176, at 49, 51 (1578 Newfoundland patent). 
179.  The Third Charter of Virginia (1611-1612), in 7 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra 
note 176, at 3802, 3806. Some early grants to individual proprietors stated that the laws were 
to be “as near as may be” agreeable to the laws of England. See BILDER, supra note 31, at 214 
n.16 (listing as examples the 1609 Virginia charter, the 1621 Virginia Ordinances, the 1629 
Mason Grant, and the 1622 Gorges and Mason grant in Maine); JOSEPH HENRY SMITH, 
APPEALS TO THE PRIVY COUNCIL FROM THE AMERICAN PLANTATIONS 465, 468-69 (1950). 
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conveniently may be, agreeable.”180 The 1629 Massachusetts Bay charter stated 
that the laws must “be not contrarie or repugnant.”181 The 1662 and 1663 
corporate charters of Connecticut and Rhode Island included contrary or 
repugnant limits.182 The language was not mere verbiage; early New England 
governments struggled with the degree to which they were bound by English 
corporate law.183 
The repugnancy language soon became disengaged from corporate status. 
It appeared in Crown grants to individual proprietors. The 1629 patent to 
Robert Heath for Carolina stated that the laws “be consonant to Reason and 
not repugnant or contrary but (as conveniently as may be done) consonant to 
the lawes, statutes, customes & rights of our Realme of England.”184 The 1632 
Maryland grant to Lord Baltimore provided that the laws “be consonant to 
Reason, and be not repugnant or contrary, but (so far as conveniently may be) 
agreeable.”185 The 1639 Maine grant to Ferdinando Gorges required laws to be 
“reasonable and not repugnant or contrary but as neere as may bee 
agreeable.”186 The 1664 letters patent from the King to his brother, James, 
Duke of York, for New York required that the laws not be “contrary” to the 
laws of England.187 Most remarkably, even self-authorizing settlements began 
to absorb the repugnancy rhetoric. In 1641, the Piscataqua River settlers, in 
 
180.  The Charter of New England (1620), in 3 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 
176, at 1827, 1832, 1833. 
181.  The Charter of Massachusetts Bay (1629), in 3 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra 
note 176, at 1846, 1853; see also id. at 1857-58. 
182.  Charter of Connecticut (1662), in 1 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 176, at 
529, 533; Charter of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations (1663), in 6 FEDERAL AND 
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 176, at 3211, 3215. 
183.  See, e.g., Mary Sarah Bilder, The Origin of the Appeal in America, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 913, 961-
64 (1997). Their anxiety over the power to imprison and impose penal measures may have 
arisen from concern that the reasoning of Clark’s Case and Dr. Bonham’s Case applied. 
184.  Sir Robert Heath’s Patent 5 Charles 1st (Oct. 30, 1629), in 1 FEDERAL AND STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 176, at 69, 71. 
185.  The Charter of Maryland (1632), in 3 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 176, at 
1677, 1680. 
186.  Grant of the Province of Maine (1639), in 3 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 
176, at 1625, 1630. 
187.  Grant of the Province of Maine (1664), in 3 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 
176, at 1637, 1638; see also DANIEL J. HULSEBOSCH, CONSTITUTING EMPIRE: NEW YORK AND 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE ATLANTIC WORLD, 1664-1830, at 44 
(2005) (discussing the repugnancy clause in the charter). 
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what would become New Hampshire, bound their own laws by the standard of 
being “not repugnant” to the laws of England.188 
The repugnancy principle limited colonial law. The 1691 Massachusetts 
Bay charter required that the laws “be not repugnant or contrary” to the laws of 
England.189 By the Revolution, every American colony was similarly bound. 
The most important English statute affecting the colonies used the limit: 
Laws By-lawes Usages or Customes . . . in any of the said Plantations 
which are in any wise repugnant to the before mentioned Lawes . . . or 
which are wayes repugnant to this present Act or to any other Law 
hereafter to bee made . . . soe farr as such Law shall relate to and 
mention the said Plantations are illegall null and void . . . .190 
Under this standard, the third branch of colonial government, the Privy 
Council, reviewed over 8500 colonial acts from colonial legislatures191 and 
around 250 appeals from colonial courts192 that had themselves struggled over 
the relationship between colonial law and the laws of England.193 The 
thousands of pages of legislation sent from the colonies to England testify to 
the pervasive reality of this practice.194 By the end of the seventeenth century, 
repugnancy to the laws of England as a limit on English corporations had 
become transformed into a limit on colonial law—what I have called elsewhere 
 
188.  The Combination of the Inhabitants upon the Piscataqua River for Government (1641), in 4 
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 176, at 2445, 2445. 
189.  The Charter of Massachusetts Bay (1691), in 3 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra 
note 176, at 1870, 1882; see AN ABSTRACT OF SOME OF THE PRINTED LAWS OF NEW-ENGLAND 1 
(n.p. 1689) (criticizing laws that “are either contrary, or not agreeable to the Laws of 
England”). 
190.  An Act for Preventing Frauds and Regulating Abuses in the Plantation Trade (Plantation 
Trade Act), 1695, 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 22, § 8; see also Royal Exchange and London Assurance 
Corporation Act, 1719, 6 Geo., c. 18 (“[T]he sole Right and Prerogative of granting Charters 
of Incorporation (not being such as are repugnant to any Law or Statute of this Realm) doth 
belong to your Majesty.”). 
191.  ELMER BEECHER RUSSELL, THE REVIEW OF AMERICAN COLONIAL LEGISLATION BY THE KING IN 
COUNCIL 221 (photo. reprint 1981) (1915). See generally id. at 139-73 (discussing conformity 
to the laws of England). 
192.  See SMITH, supra note 179, at 667-71. See generally id. at 523-653 (discussing appeals). A more 
precise count of appeals must await completion of Sharon O’Connor’s guide to 
documentation, Appeals to the Privy Council Before American Independence. 
193.  See BILDER, supra note 31, at 91-114 (discussing Rhode Island cases); Bilder, supra note 173. 
194.  See Charles M. Andrews, List of the Journals and Acts of the Councils and Assemblies of the 
Thirteen Original Colonies, and the Floridas, in America, Preserved in the Public Record Office, 
London, in 1 ANN. REP. AM. HIST. ASS’N FOR THE YEAR 1908 app. D, at 399 (1909). 
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a “transatlantic constitution.”195 This constitution structured colonial law by 
absorbing the repugnancy principle and, in particular, the emphasis on Magna 
Carta as a meaningful constraint on lawmaking authority. Colonial law also 
absorbed the corporate argument that ordinances could diverge for reasons of 
immemorial custom relating to the particular people or place.196 Awareness of 
this transformation appears in 1701 in the comment of the anonymous author 
of An Essay upon the Government of the English Plantations on the Continent of 
America. Did colonial legislatures have the power to pass “Acts or Ordinances 
in the nature of by-Laws only”?197 Or, as he asked, were they something more: 
“[H]ow far [is] the Legislative Authority . . . in the Assemblies of the several 
Colonies”?198 
Throughout the eighteenth century, on both sides of the Atlantic, 
lawmakers and legal observers understood the repugnancy limit. A few 
examples must suffice.199 Barbados’s Attorney General described the 
Governor’s commission as requiring that “no laws shall be passed, that are 
repugnant to the laws of England.”200 In 1729, dissenting Rhode Island judges 
argued that the practice of interpreting “jointly” to permit descent to heirs was 
 
195.  BILDER, supra note 31, at 1. 
196.  On these arguments, see id. at 3, 139; and JACK P. GREENE, PERIPHERIES AND CENTER: 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE EXTENDED POLITIES OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE AND THE 
UNITED STATES, 1607-1788, at 19-42 (1986). On the Empire’s use of the same language, see 
SWINFEN, supra note 23, at 66-69. 
197.  AN ESSAY UPON THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ENGLISH PLANTATIONS ON THE CONTINENT OF 
AMERICA 23 (Louis B. Wright ed., Huntingdon Library 1945) (1701) (asking also whether 
colonial assemblies could “make Acts of Attainder, Naturalization, for set[t]ling or 
disposing of Titles to Lands . . . , and other things of the like Nature; and where Necessity 
requires, make such Acts as best suit the Circumstances and Constitution of the Country, 
even tho’ in some Particulars, they plainly differ from the Laws of England”). 
198.  Id. Additional examples of legislative authority in contrast to bylaw power included the 
powers of “Illegitimating of Heirs” and “cutting off Intails.” Id. at 40. The author also asked 
whether “they may make Laws disagre[e]able to the Laws of England, in such Cases, where 
the Circumstances of the Places are vastly different, as concerning Plantations, Waste, the 
Church, &c.” Id. 
199.  For further examples, see GREENE, supra note 196, at 19-42. 
200.  The Opinion of the Attorney-General Rawlin, of Barbadoes, on the Act of Assembly, 
Creating Paper Money (n.d.), in 2 GEORGE CHALMERS, OPINIONS OF EMINENT LAWYERS, ON 
VARIOUS POINTS OF ENGLISH JURISPRUDENCE 27, 29 (London, Reed & Hunter 1814); see also 
id. at 30 (criticizing an act for being contrary to Magna Carta, English statutes, and the 
“maxim, that an act of parliament, that is against common right, or reason, or is repugnant, 
or impossible, in itself, is void”). 
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“contrary and repugnant” to the laws of England regarding joint tenancy.201 In 
1730, the English Attorney General and Solicitor General explained that 
Connecticut had the power of making bylaws and laws affecting property but 
that any laws “repugnant to the laws of England” were “absolutely null and 
void.”202 In 1738, New York’s Lieutenant Governor stated that the “constitution 
of the Government is such . . . whereby the Governour with the Council and 
Assembly are empowered to pass laws not repugnant to the laws of 
England.”203 
In the years preceding the Revolution, awareness of the repugnancy 
constraint continued. In 1760, the Chief Justice of the South Carolina Court of 
Common Pleas discussed the meaning of “repugnancy.”204 A member of the 
Inner Temple wrote that the colonists did have “‘a Right to make Laws . . . 
provided’ that they were ‘not repugnant to the Laws of their Mother-
Country.’”205 James Wilson noted that the King had a “negative on the 
different legislatures throughout his dominions, so that he can prevent any 
repugnancy in their different laws.”206 
This constitutional limit on colonial law was familiar to the legal 
commentators of the early nineteenth century. Joseph Story declared that the 
 
201.  BILDER, supra note 31, at 109. Cases in Rhode Island often involved arguments over the 
colony’s practices or customs rather than the direct repugnancy raised by a particular 
colonial statute. See id. at 110-11. 
202.  The Opinion of the Attorney and Solicitor-General, Yorke, and Talbot, on the Power of the 
Assembly of Connecticut To Make Laws (1730), in 1 CHALMERS, supra note 200, at 353, 354 
(discussing a Connecticut charter). In 1755, Attorney General William Murray stated that 
there “always is a restriction, that [the colonial laws] shall not be contrary to the laws of 
England.” The Opinion of the Attorney-General Murray, on the Question, Whether an 
Assembly Can Impose a Duty on the Importation of Convicts into a Colony (1755), in 1 
CHALMERS, supra note 200, at 344, 347. 
203.  Mr. Clarke’s Answers to Queries of Board of Trade (June 2, 1738), in 6 DOCUMENTS 
RELATIVE TO THE COLONIAL HISTORY OF THE STATE OF NEW-YORK 120 (E.B. O’Callaghan 
ed., Albany, Weed, Parsons & Co. 1855), quoted in Daniel J. Hulsebosch, Imperia in Imperio: 
The Multiple Constitutions of Empire in New York, 1750-1777, 16 LAW & HIST. REV. 319, 320 
(1998). 
204.  In Williams v. Executors of Watson (S.C. Ct. Com. Pl. 1760), South Carolina Chief Justice 
Michie concluded that a colony act relating to intestate administration was not repugnant to 
the laws of England, and he suggested that in any case only the Privy Council, not a colonial 
court, could void a repugnant colonial law. See SMITH, supra note 179, at 586-91; see also 
Beth, supra note 22, at 41-42 (emphasizing that the defendant’s counsel thought the colonial 
court could exercise judicial review). 
205.  GREENE, supra note 196, at 97 (quoting a pamphlet published in 1766). 
206.  2 JAMES WILSON, Considerations on the Nature and Extent of the Legislative Authority of the 
British Parliament (1774), in THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 51, at 721, 745. 
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colonial “assemblies had the power of making local laws and ordinances, not 
repugnant to the laws of England, but as near as may be agreeable thereto, 
subject to the ratification and disapproval of the crown.”207 Throughout the 
lengthy 200-page discussion of the “charters, constitutional history, and ante-
revolutionary jurisprudence of the Colonies,” Story repeatedly noted instances 
in which lawmaking power had been limited by the word “repugnant.”208 He 
declared that “all their laws were required to be not repugnant unto, but, as 
near as might be, agreeable to the laws and statutes of England.”209 The Crown 
had a “negative” on the laws and a right of revision through appeal.210 Story 
explained that the repugnancy condition was “a limitation upon the legislative 
power contained in an express clause of all the charters; and could not be 
transcended without a clear breach of their fundamental conditions.”211 The 
colonies had only a delegated, constrained legislative authority. 
B. American Constitutions and Repugnancy 
The Revolution did not end the use of the repugnancy principle as a 
limitation upon legislative power. The years leading up to the Revolution had 
seen an extensive debate over the nature of parliamentary and legislative 
 
207.  1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 159, at 144 
(Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833); see also Thomas Sergeant, A Brief Sketch of the National 
Judiciary Powers Exercised in the United States, from the First Settlement of the Colonies to the 
Time of the Adoption of the Present Federal Constitution, in PETER S. DU PONCEAU, A 
DISSERTATION ON THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS OF THE 
UNITED STATES 135, 141 (photo. reprint 1993) (Phila., Abraham Small 1824) (describing the 
“general superintending power by way of appeal” of the Privy Council over the decisions of 
“colonial tribunals”). 
208.  1 STORY, supra note 207, at 2; see id. § 56, at 40 (Plymouth); id. § 71, at 55 (Massachusetts); 
id. § 80, at 67 (New Hampshire); id. § 82, at 69 (Maine); id. § 96, at 83 (Rhode Island); id. 
§ 104, at 93 (Maryland); id. § 119, at 108 (New Jersey); id. § 122, at 110 (Pennsylvania); id. 
§ 143, at 129 (Georgia); id. § 164, at 148 (noting the word in the Plantation Trade Act, 1695, 
7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 22); id. § 181, at 167 (referring to the 1727 Connecticut case of Winthrop v. 
Lechmere); id. § 188, at 174 (quoting an address of the Massachusetts General Court in 1761); 
see also id. § 156, at 139 (stating that under the charters, “no laws shall be made, which are 
repugnant to, but as near as may be conveniently, shall conform to the laws of England”). 
209.  Id. § 163, at 147. 
210.  Id. § 210, at 196 (noting the repugnancy limitation). 
211.  Id. § 163, at 147. Still, he noted that a “very liberal exposition of this clause seems, however, 
always to have prevailed, and to have been acquiesced in, if not adopted by the crown.” Id. 
BILDER FORMATTED_08-28-06 12/6/2006 5:58:03 PM 
the yale law journal 116:502   2006 
542 
 
power.212 The conclusion to be drawn about legislative power was 
ambiguous.213 English legal and political thought claimed Parliament was 
supreme; American legal and political thought attempted to constrain 
parliamentary power over the colonies.214 The idea of legislative supremacy 
could be supported by the English parliamentary claim and the dominance of 
the colonial legislatures. The commitment to constrained legislative power 
received equally strong support from the need to limit Parliament and from the 
colonial transatlantic constitution. 
The post-Revolutionary process of writing state constitutions reinforced 
the belief that the legislature held delegated constitutional authority. The 
“constitution” replaced the Crown or Parliament as the delegator of governance 
authority. As Samuel Adams wrote in 1768, “[T]he Constitution is fixd; & as 
the supreme Legislative derives its Power & Authority from the Constitution, it 
cannot overleap the Bounds of it without destroying its own foundation.”215 In 
1776, an anonymous author argued that the English had no constitution, “their 
legislative power being unlimited without either condition or controul, except 
in the single instance of trial by Juries.” A constitution “says to the legislative 
powers, ‘Thus far shalt thou go, and no farther.’”216 In certain new state 
constitutions, repugnancy served explicitly to constrain state legislation.217 In 
 
212.  See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 200-29 
(rev. ed. 1992); WOOD, supra note 21. For contemporary discussion, see, for example, 
WILSON, supra note 206. 
213.  For discussion of the relationship between these competing ideas and judicial review, see 
John Phillip Reid, Another Origin of Judicial Review: The Constitutional Crisis of 1776 and the 
Need for a Dernier Judge, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 963 (1989). 
214.  For contemporary discussions, see, for example, Paxton’s Case (Mass. 1761), in QUINCY, 
supra note 5, at 51, 55 (argument of James Otis); DANIEL DULANY, CONSIDERATIONS ON THE 
PROPRIETY OF IMPOSING TAXES IN THE BRITISH COLONIES (Annapolis, 1765), reprinted in 1 
PAMPHLETS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 1750-1776, at 598 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1965) 
[hereinafter PAMPHLETS]; and JAMES OTIS, THE RIGHTS OF THE BRITISH COLONIES ASSERTED 
AND PROVED (Boston, Edes & Gill 1764), reprinted in 1 PAMPHLETS, supra, at 408. 
215.  The House of Representatives of Mass. to the Speakers of Other Houses of Representatives 
(Feb. 11, 1768), in 1 WRITINGS OF SAMUEL ADAMS 184, 185 (Harry Alonzo Cushing ed., 1904); 
see also WOOD, supra note 21, at 266-67 (quoting Adams). 
216.  Letter IV, in FOUR LETTERS ON INTERESTING SUBJECTS (Phila., Steiner & Cist 1776), reprinted 
in THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE AND OTHER WRITINGS 74, 75 (Gordon Wood ed., 2003) 
(following A. Owen Aldridge’s attribution of the pamphlet to Paine). 
217.  BILDER, supra note 31, at 187. The substitution of “constitution” for the “laws of England” 
was not new. See Gerald Stourzh, Constitution: Changing Meanings of the Term from the 
Early Seventeenth to the Late Eighteenth Century, in CONCEPTUAL CHANGE AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 35, 43 (Terence Ball & J.G.A. Pocock eds., 1988) (quoting seventeenth-
century lawyer Roger North to the effect that “constitution” was “more frequently 
supplanting older expressions such as ‘the laws of this Kingdom, his Majesty’s Laws, [or] 
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1786, James Iredell summarized the continuation of a practice of limiting 
legislative power. In reference to the writing of the North Carolina state 
constitution, he explained, “We were not ignorant of the theory of the necessity 
of the legislature being absolute in all cases, because it was the great ground of the 
British pretensions. But this was a mere speculative principle, which men at 
ease and leisure thought proper to assume.” Because the state constitution 
rejected such a theory, he declared, “I have therefore no doubt, but that the 
power of the Assembly is limited and defined by the constitution.”218 
In a series of well-studied cases, state judges repeatedly affirmed that 
legislation could not be repugnant to the state constitution, often using the 
specific language of repugnancy.219 In New Jersey in 1780, state court judges 
found a legislatively authorized six-man jury contrary to the new state 
constitution.220 In Virginia in 1782, judges heard arguments that a legislative 
act pardoning prisoners was “contrary to the plain declaration of the 
 
the Laws of the Land’”). On the related issue of reception of the laws of England not 
“repugnant” to American state common and constitutional law, see generally ELIZABETH 
GASPAR BROWN, BRITISH STATUTES IN AMERICAN LAW, 1776-1836 (1964). 
218.  An Elector [James Iredell], To The Public (Aug. 17, 1786), in 2 GRIFFITH J. MCREE, LIFE AND 
CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES IREDELL 145, 146 (N.Y., D. Appleton & Co. 1858); see also James 
Iredell, Instructions to Chowan County Representatives (Sept. 1783), in 2 THE PAPERS OF 
JAMES IREDELL 446, 449 (Don Higginbotham ed., 1976) (describing “a Republic where the 
Law is superior to any or all the Individuals, and the Constitution is superior even to the 
Legislature, and of which the Judges are the guardians and protectors”). 
219.  Scholarly examination of these cases began in the nineteenth century. See, e.g., QUINCY, 
supra note 5, app. 1, at 529 n.32; Wm. M. Meigs, The Relation of the Judiciary to the 
Constitution, 19 AM. L. REV. 175, 178-83 (1885). For modern discussion, see, for example, 
RAOUL BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT 36-46 (1969); 1 LOUIS B. BOUDIN, 
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 51-72 (photo. reprint 1993) (1932); CLINTON, supra note 6; 2 
CROSSKEY, supra note 11, at 938-75; JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., 1 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE UNITED STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 125-42 (1971); CHARLES 
GROVE HAINES, THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY (2d ed. 1932); LEONARD 
W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS’ CONSTITUTION (1988); SYLVIA SNOWISS, 
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION (1990); and WOOD, supra note 21, at 
453-63. This Article does not discuss The Josiah Philips Case (Va. Gen. Ct. 1778) because of 
the absence of significant extant materials. See 1 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S 
COMMENTARIES app. note D, at 293 (photo. reprint 1996) (Phila., William Young Birch & 
Abraham Small 1803); William Romaine Tyree, The Case of Josiah Phillips, 16 VA. L. REG. 
648 (1911). Although the reasoning in Rutgers v. Waddington (N.Y. 1784) was based on a 
similar theory of repugancy, it focused on the relationship of a statute to a treaty or the law 
of nations. See 1 THE LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON: DOCUMENTS AND 
COMMENTARY 392-419 (Julius Goebel, Jr. ed., 1964). 
220.  Austin Scott, Holmes vs. Walton: The New Jersey Precedent, 4 AM. HIST. REV. 456 (1899) 
(discussing Holmes v. Walton (N.J. 1780)); see N.J. CONST. of 1776, art. 22, in 5 FEDERAL AND 
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 176, at 2594, 2598; State v. Parkhurst, 9 N.J.L. (4 Halst.) 
427 (1802). Acts in 1775 and 1778 authorized the jury. Scott, supra, at 457-58. 
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constitution; and therefore void.”221 Discussion arose over whether a court 
could “declare an Act of the Legislature void because it was repugnant” to the 
constitution.222 Most of the judges believed “that the court had power to 
declare” a legislative act “unconstitutional and void.”223 In Rhode Island in 
1786, attorneys argued that a statute denying a jury trial was “unconstitutional, 
and repugnant to the Law of the Land.”224 The legislature could only “make[] 
laws not repugnant to the constitution”; the judiciary could not execute an act 
that was “against the constitution.”225 Judge David Howell justified the court’s 
refusal to take cognizance of the case as required by the law by describing the 
law as “repugnant and unconstitutional.”226 In New Hampshire in 1786, an 
inferior court heard cases questioning whether an act effectively denying a jury 
trial was “Against the Express Letter & Spirit of said Constitution & Against 
the Law of the Land.”227 The state constitution provided that legislation must 
not be “repugnant, or contrary to this constitution.”228 The court concluded 
that the act was “Manifestly Contrary to the Constitution of this State.”229 In 
North Carolina in 1787, an act denying jury trial was allegedly unconstitutional 
and void. The court considering the act concluded that the constitution was the 
“fundamental law of the land,” and the act was therefore abrogated.230 
These judges did not intend to create judicial review; they simply continued 
to assume that legislation could not be repugnant to what was now termed a 
constitution. The colonial limit of repugnancy was being transformed into an 
American principle of written constitutionalism. Corporations had held 
delegated bylaw authority from the Crown; colonies had held delegated 
 
221.  Commonwealth v. Caton, 8 Va. (4 Call.) 5, 7 (1782). 
222.  Pendleton’s Account of “The Case of the Prisoners” (Caton v. Commonwealth) (Oct. 29, 1782), 
in 2 THE LETTERS AND PAPERS OF EDMUND PENDLETON, 1734-1803, at 416, 417 (David John 
Mays ed., Va. Historical Soc’y Documents 8, 1967); see Treanor, Case of the Prisoners, supra 
note 14 (discussing the case). 
223.  Caton, 8 Va. (4 Call.) at 20. Pendleton declined to reach the issue. 
224.  Providence, Sept. 30, PROVIDENCE (R.I.) GAZETTE & COUNTRY J., Sept. 30, 1786, at 2; see 
BILDER, supra note 31, at 188-90. 
225.  JAMES M. VARNUM, THE CASE, TREVETT AGAINST WEEDEN 1, 27 (Providence, John Carter 
1787) (recording proceedings in Trevett v. Weeden (R.I. 1786)). 
226.  2 CROSSKEY, supra note 11, at 966 (quoting a 1786 newspaper report). 
227.  Ten Pound Act Cases (N.H. Inferior Ct. Com. Pl. 1786), in Richard M. Lambert, The “Ten 
Pound Act” Cases and the Origins of Judicial Review in New Hampshire, 43 N.H. B.J. 37, 41 
(2002). 
228.  N.H. CONST. of 1784, in 4 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 176, at 2453, 2458. 
229.  Ten Pound Act Cases, in Lambert, supra note 227, at 45. 
230.  Bayard v. Singleton, 1 N.C. 5, 7, 1 Mart. 48 (Super. Ct. Law & Eq. 1787). 
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legislative power from the Crown and Parliament. The state legislatures, in 
turn, held delegated authority from the people. 
This understanding explicitly appeared in several of these cases. Rhode 
Island attorneys argued that the “powers of legislation” are “derived from the 
people at large” and are therefore “subordinate”;231 legislation was thus 
constrained by the charter and constitution.232 A New Hampshire attorney 
argued that the legislature could not “exercise a Power which is not deriv’d 
from the constitution” and that the courts were the “constitutional Barriers 
between the Power of the Legislature and the liberty of the People.”233 The 
report of the North Carolina court stated that the legislature could not repeal 
or alter the Constitution without “destroy[ing] their own existence as a 
Legislature.”234 A practice that had involved delegated legislative power from 
the Crown slid easily into one now described as arising from delegated 
legislative power of the people.235 
C. The United States Constitution and Repugnancy 
At the national level, repugnancy continued to prove relevant. Under the 
Articles of Confederation, there was little occasion to consider the implications 
of “repugnancy” with regard to congressional acts. The Continental Congress, 
however, used repugnancy to regulate the similar relationship of state statutes 
to a treaty. Congress was concerned that certain state acts were “repugnant” to 
the 1783 peace treaty, and in the spring of 1787, it recommended that the states 
pass legislation providing “such acts and parts of acts repugnant to the treaty of 
peace . . . shall be and thereby are repealed.” Courts were to “decide and 
adjudge” according to the act.236 
The proposed revision of the Articles of Confederation raised the relevance 
of repugnancy to a new government structure. An editorial in a New York 
 
231.  VARNUM, supra note 225, at 21; see id. at 26 (stating that the legislature’s power of making 
laws “is derived from the constitution, is subordinate to it”). 
232.  Id. at 22-26; see id. at 35. 
233.  Lambert, supra note 227, at 44. 
234.  Bayard, 1 N.C. at 7 (providing a reporter’s account of observations of the Superior Court of 
Law and Equity). 
235.  For the argument that this idea of delegation did not give rise to judicial review, see 2 
CROSSKEY, supra note 11, at 938-75. 
236.  32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 125 (Worthington C. Ford et al. 
eds., 1936) (discussing repugnancy resolutions); see id. at 177-84 (explaining the rationale 
for the resolution). In response, states repealed conflicting legislation. See, e.g., id. at 303 n.1 
(Massachusetts); id. at 353 n.1 (Connecticut). 
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paper in June 1787 argued that the corporate bylaw practice should serve as a 
model. The “West-Chester Farmer” suggested that the states “should still 
retain the subordinate power of legislation” under any new government.237 
They should be permitted to make “local ordinances, not repugnant to the laws 
of the supreme power.”238 They would have the power to make bylaws under 
constitutions that should provide “that all laws, by laws, usages and customs, 
repugnant to any law or ordinance made, or to be made, by the supreme 
power, shall be utterly void and of none effect.”239 As the author noted, “[I]n 
other words, they are to be in the nature of civil corporations.”240 
Although this state-as-corporation model was not adopted,241 almost every 
one of the occasional comments made at the Convention regarding judicial 
review betrayed the preexisting assumption that legislation would be limited 
by the Constitution and that judges would therefore necessarily declare laws 
contrary to the Constitution void.242 These comments mostly occurred in 
 
237.  West-Chester Farmer, To the Citizens of America, N.Y. DAILY ADVERTISER, June 8, 1787, in 13 
THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 128, 129 (John P. 
Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1981) [hereinafter DHRC].  
238.  Id. 
239.  Id. at 129-30.  
240.  Id. at 129. On the conceptualization of states as corporations, see FREDERIC WILLIAM 
MAITLAND, SELECTED ESSAYS 123-24 (1936); and Eric Enlow, The Corporate Conception of the 
State and the Origins of Limited Constitutional Government, 6 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 1 (2001). 
241.  The degree to which the states could be analogized to corporations was occasionally 
mentioned during the Convention. Gouverneur Morris commented on the original nature of 
the colonial relationship: the states before the Revolution had been “nothing more than 
colonial corporations.” 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 552 (Max 
Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966) [hereinafter RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION] (July 7). 
James Madison allegedly described the states as “only great corporations, having the power 
of making by-laws, and these are effectual only if they are not contradictory to the general 
confederation.” Id. at 471 (June 29) (Yates’s notes). Madison later cast doubt on the accuracy 
of Yates’s notes with respect to this comment. See Letter from James Madison to W.C. Rives 
(Oct. 21, 1833), in 3 id. at 521, 521-22. Yates also recorded Hamilton as desiring to reduce the 
states to “simple corporations.” Extracts from Yates’s Secret Proceedings, in 3 RECORDS OF 
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra, at 410, 413. Madison did later write Jefferson, “How long 
has it taken to fix, and how imperfectly is yet fixed the legislative power of corporations, 
though that power is subordinate in the most compleat manner?” Letter from James 
Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), in JAMES MADISON, WRITINGS 148 (Jack 
Rakove ed., 1999). 
242.  The sources for this debate have changed little over the last century. See, e.g., CHARLES A. 
BEARD, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION (1912); BERGER, supra note 219, at 47-
81; KRAMER, supra note 5, at 78-92; Meigs, supra note 219, at 183-85; Prakash & Yoo, Origins, 
supra note 12; Prakash & Yoo, Questions, supra note 12. Most of those commenting on 
judicial review had studied law, including Gunning Bedford, John Dickinson, Alexander 
Hamilton, Rufus King, Luther Martin, John Mercer, and James Wilson. See FRAMERS OF 
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discussions relating to the negativing power (usually over state legislation), an 
executive-judicial Council of Revision, and an executive veto (usually over 
federal legislation).243 Concerns about explicitly mixing executive and judicial 
powers and anxiety over the evisceration of the states sunk these proposals. 
Not one, however, was rejected because of disagreement over judges’ duty to 
void laws contrary to the Constitution; in fact, the presumed continuation of 
the practice may have served in some minds as a rationale for the rejections. 
The delegates who seemed to disagree with judicial review used the word 
“ought,” signaling an aspiration rather than present reality or future 
expectations. In June, Gunning Bedford declared (as Madison later 
summarized) that the representatives of the people “ought to be under no 
external control whatever.”244 In August, in a discussion over the executive 
veto, Francis Mercer stated that that he “disapproved of the Doctrine that the 
Judges as expositors of the Constitution should have authority to declare a law 
void. He thought laws ought to be well and cautiously made, and then to be 
uncontroulable.”245 Mercer’s reference to “Doctrine” emphasized the prior 
existence of the practice. John Dickenson was “strongly impressed” by Mercer’s 
 
THE CONSTITUTION 125-26, 139, 155, 163, 177, 181, 210 (James H. Charleton et al. eds., 1986). 
Those speaking on the subject who did not explicitly train as lawyers were James Madison, 
George Mason, and Elbridge Gerry. Madison and Mason, however, both read extensively in 
law. See id. at 172, 179. 
243.  Madison and others argued for a continuation of the practice of reviewing legislation, 
proposing that the national legislature enjoy the power to negative state laws “as heretofore 
exercised by the Kingly prerogative.” Letter from James Madison to George Washington 
(Apr. 16, 1787), in WRITINGS, supra note 241, at 80, 81; see also 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION, supra note 241, at 164 (June 8) (presenting Pinckney’s statement that the 
“negative of the Crown had been found beneficial”); id. at 168 (June 8) (presenting 
Madison’s statement that it had been “the practice in Royal Colonies before the Revolution 
and would not have been inconvenient”). Alexander Hamilton’s rejected plan for the 
government provided for “[a]ll laws of the particular States contrary to the Constitution or 
laws of the United States to be utterly void.” 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, 
supra note 241, at 293 (June 18). 
244.  1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 241, at 101 (June 4) (presenting the 
debate over the Council of Revision and the executive veto); see also id. at 106 (June 4) 
(Yates’s notes) (discussing Bedford’s opposition to the executive veto); id. at 109 (Pierce’s 
notes) (discussing Bedford’s “opinion that no check was necessary on a Legislature”). The 
statement was even more ambiguous in context, as it was seemingly aimed at rejecting both 
the Council of Revision and an executive veto. Bedford emphasized that he opposed “every 
check on the Legislative” and “thought it would be sufficient to mark out in the 
Constitution the boundaries to the Legislative Authority” because the two branches (i.e., the 
two Houses of Congress) would check themselves. Id. at 100-01 (June 4). 
245.  2 id. at 298 (Aug. 15). For another effort to show that the comments of Mercer and 
Dickinson “might actually advance the case for judicial review of federal legislation,” see 
Prakash & Yoo, Origins, supra note 12, at 943. 
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comment and noted that he “thought no such power ought to exist.” However, 
Dickenson concluded that he “was at the same time at a loss what expedient to 
substitute.”246 Richard Spaight’s famous letter to James Iredell similarly 
commented that “no judiciary ought ever to possess” the power to negative 
legislation.247 Not one of these delegates further argued the point. 
In contrast, other comments assumed a continuing practice. In debates over 
the Council of Revision, Rufus King assumed that judges would “no doubt 
stop the operation of such [statutes] as shall appear repugnant to the 
constitution.”248 Elbridge Gerry noted that in some states, with “general 
approbation,” the “Judges had <actually> set aside laws as being agst. the 
 
246.  2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 241, at 299 (Aug. 15). Gouverneur 
Morris equivocated: “He could not agree that the Judiciary which was part of the Executive, 
should be bound to say that a direct violation of the Constitution was law. A controul over 
the legislature might have its inconveniences. But view the danger on the other side.” Id. 
247.  Letter from Richard Spaight to James Iredell (Aug. 12, 1787), in 2 MCREE, supra note 218, at 
168, 169 (adding that “it would have been absurd, and contrary to the practice of all the 
world,” if the judges had the power to operate as “an absolute negative on the proceedings 
of the Legislature, which no judiciary ought ever to possess”); see also WILLIS P. WHICHARD, 
JUSTICE JAMES IREDELL 13-14 (2000) (discussing Spaight’s letter to Iredell). Despite a 
century of repeated citation, the views of Spaight, a North Carolina delegate to the 
Constitutional Convention, deserve less precedential weight. See COXE, supra note 5, at 385-
86 (reprinting Spaight’s letter to Iredell and being among the first to call attention to the 
correspondence); SNOWISS, supra note 219, at 33 (citing Spaight as emblematic of an 
unidentified group of judicial-review opponents). Spaight, of course, never made the 
comment at the Convention. More importantly, Spaight wanted America to follow the 
world’s practice, not prior American practice. He had lived for much of his young life in 
Scotland. He was educated at the University of Glasgow and did not return to the colonies 
until 1778. JOHN H. WHEELER, SKETCH OF THE LIFE OF RICHARD DOBBS SPAIGHT OF NORTH 
CAROLINA 9 (Balt., William K. Boyle 1880). Iredell’s response interestingly emphasized the 
difference between England and America. See Letter from James Iredell to Richard Spaight 
(Aug. 26, 1787), in 2 MCREE, supra note 218, at 172, 172 (“Without an express Constitution 
the powers of the Legislature would undoubtedly have been absolute (as the Parliament in 
Great Britain is held to be) . . . .”); see also 1 THE PAPERS OF JAMES IREDELL, supra note 218, at 
xxxvii (noting that Iredell moved from England to North Carolina in 1768 at the age of 
seventeen); WHICHARD, supra, at xv, 3-4 (discussing Iredell’s colonial legal education). 
Iredell’s comment—“it has ever been my opinion, that an act inconsistent with the 
Constitution was void; and that the judges, consistently with their duties, could not carry it 
into effect”—echoed his own American legal education. Letter from James Iredell to Richard 
Spaight, supra, at 172; see WHICHARD, supra, at 3-8. The European perspective was also 
apparent in the remark of the principal French diplomat that the power of the Supreme 
Court to hear cases arising under the Constitution meant that the states “will resemble 
corporations rather than Sovereign assemblies.” Letter from Louis Guillaume Otto to Comte 
de Montmorin (Oct. 20, 1787), in 13 DHRC, supra note 237, at 422, 424-25. 
248.  1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 241, at 109 (Pierce’s notes). 
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Constitution.”249 James Wilson worried that without the ability to negative 
state laws in advance of promulgation, laws that “may be unjust, may be 
unwise, may be dangerous, may be destructive,” might not “be so 
unconstitutional as to justify the Judges in refusing to give them effect.”250 
Luther Martin stated that “as to the Constitutionality of laws, that point will 
come before the Judges in their proper official character.”251 George Mason 
referred to Martin’s comment to the effect that judges, in their “expository 
capacity,” could “declare an unconstitutional law void.”252 James Madison 
stated, “A law violating a constitution established by the people themselves, 
would be considered by the Judges as null & void.”253 
This assumption that state and federal legislation would be bound by the 
Constitution—and that the judiciary would enforce this limit—explains the 
parallel addition, near the end of the Convention, of “the Constitution” to the 
Supremacy Clause and the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction. On August 23, John 
Rutledge moved to clarify that state legislation would be bound by the 
Constitution.254 On August 27, Samuel Johnson moved to add “this 
Constitution” to the jurisdictional grant for the Court.255 Johnson wanted the 
 
249.  Id. at 97 (June 4) (alteration in original) (noting that the judiciary “will have a sufficient 
check agst. encroachments on their own department by their exposition of the laws, which 
involved a power of deciding on their Constitutionality”). 
250.  2 id. at 73 (July 21) (stating that “[j]udges, as expositors of the Laws would have an 
opportunity of defending their constitutional rights,” but that the power did not “go far 
enough”); see also id. at 391 (Aug. 23) (“The firmness of Judges is not of itself sufficient . . . . 
It will be better to prevent the passage of an improper law, than to declare it void when 
passed.”). 
251.  Id. at 76 (July 21) (noting that in “this character they have a negative on the laws”). 
252.  Id. at 78 (July 21). He continued, “But with regard to every law however unjust oppressive 
or pernicious, which did not come plainly under this description, they would be under the 
necessity as Judges to give it a free course.” Id. 
253.  Id. at 93 (July 23); see id. at 440 (Aug. 28) (presenting Madison’s comment that the 
prohibition of ex post facto laws “will oblige the Judges to declare such interferences null & 
void”); see also id. at 376 (quoting a similar comment by Hugh Williamson). 
254.  The Committee of Detail’s version of the Supremacy Clause (art. VIII) provided: “The Acts 
of the Legislature of the United States made in pursuance of this Constitution, and all 
treaties made . . . shall be the supreme law of the several States . . . and the judges in the 
several States shall be bound thereby in their decisions . . . .” Id. at 183 (Aug. 6). The motion 
altered it to: “This Constitution and the Laws of the United States made in pursuance 
thereof . . . shall be the supreme law of the several States . . . and the Judges in the several 
States shall be bound thereby in their decisions . . . .” Id. at 381-82 (Aug. 23); see also id. at 
389 (presenting Rutledge’s motion). 
255.  Article XI, section 3 of the Committee of Detail draft provided: “The Jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court shall extend to all cases arising under laws passed by the Legislature of the 
United States . . . .” Id. at 186 (Aug. 6). The motion, along with another one by Rutledge, 
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two clauses to be conformable.256 Both amendments passed unanimously.257 
No one argued that the judiciary should not enforce constitutional constraints 
on legislation.258 The Constitution now appeared to have textual authorization 
for judicial enforcement of constitutional constraints on state and federal 
legislation. 
At the state ratifying conventions, the limited nature of legislative power 
and the judiciary’s concomitant role was repeatedly presumed. In 
Pennsylvania, James Wilson stated that “under this Constitution, the 
legislature may be restrained, and kept within its prescribed bounds, by the 
 
resulted in the clause stating: “The Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall extend to all 
cases arising under the Constitution, the laws of the United States . . . .” Id. at 423-24, 430-32 
(Aug. 27). In the late nineteenth century, Brinton Coxe argued that the “arising under” 
clause represented explicit textual authorization for judicial review. See COXE, supra note 5, 
at 336-39; see also Bradford R. Clark, The Supremacy Clause as a Constraint on Federal Power, 
71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 91, 91 (2003) (arguing that the Supremacy Clause provides an 
“express textual basis for judicial review of federal statutes” claimed to exceed federal 
authority); Prakash & Yoo, Origins, supra note 12, at 907 (making a similar argument). 
256.  See 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 241, at 430-31. Like others who 
assumed a continuing practice, Rutledge and Johnson had studied law; indeed, they may 
have been particularly knowledgeable about colonial repugnancy practice under English law. 
During the 1760s, Rutledge was at the Middle Temple and Johnson received a Doctor of 
Laws from Oxford University. See MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION 33 
(1913) (discussing Johnson); FRAMERS OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 242, at 198 
(discussing Rutledge). The Columbia Law School Library holds a collection of Privy 
Council appeals briefs with notes believed to be by Johnson. Connecticut Cases, &c. (c. 1771) 
(on file with the William Samuel Johnson Collection, Diamond Law Library, Columbia Law 
School). 
257.  See 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 241, at 430-31; Amended Draft 
Constitution Submitted to the Committee of Style (Sept. 10, 1787), in 1 DHRC, supra note 
237, at 270, 281 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976). 
258.  Madison “doubted whether it was not going too far to extend the jurisdiction of the Court 
generally to cases arising Under the Constitution, & whether it ought not to be limited to 
cases of a Judiciary Nature. The right of expounding the Constitution in cases not of this 
nature ought not to be given to that Department.” 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION, supra note 241, at 430 (Aug. 27). Johnson’s motion was unanimously 
approved because, according to Madison’s self-referential comment, it was “generally 
supposed that the jurisdiction given was constructively limited to cases of a Judiciary 
nature.” Id. Madison seems likely to have meant that the grant should not be read to extend 
the jurisdiction into the legislative or executive power. This conversation was not the only 
appearance of “judiciary nature.” See 1 id. at 63, 67 (June 1) (statement of James Madison) 
(defining executive power as “to execute such powers, not legislative or judiciary in their 
nature”); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison), reprinted in 2 THE DEBATE ON 
THE CONSTITUTION 136, 136 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993) (“After discriminating therefore in 
theory, the several classes of power, as they may in their nature be legislative, executive, or 
judiciary, the next and most difficult task is to provide some practical security for each 
against the invasion of the others.”). 
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interposition of the judicial department.”259 In Connecticut, Oliver Ellsworth 
declared: 
If the general legislature should at any time overleap their limits, the 
judicial department is a constitutional check. If the United States go 
beyond their powers, if they make a law which the Constitution does 
not authorize, it is void; and the judicial power, the national judges, 
who to secure their impartiality are to be made independent, will 
declare it to be void.260 
In Massachusetts, Samuel Adams explained, “if any law made by the federal 
government shall be extended beyond the power granted by the proposed 
Constitution, and inconsistent with the Constitution of this State, it will be an 
errour, and adjudged by the courts of law to be void.”261 
Despite the lengthy debates in the Virginia convention over the boundaries 
between state and national authority and the independent spirit of the 
judiciary, opposing delegates repeatedly agreed that legislation contrary to the 
Constitution had to be declared void by judges.262 Edmund Pendleton noted 
that the state judiciary had “prevented the operation of some unconstitutional 
acts.”263 Patrick Henry commented, “I take it as the highest encomium on this 
 
259.  2 DHRC, supra note 237, at 450 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976) (Dec. 1, 1787); see id. (“[T]he 
power of the Constitution was paramount to the power of the legislature, acting under that 
Constitution. . . . [T]he legislature, when acting in that capacity, may transgress the bounds 
assigned to it . . . ; but when it comes to be discussed before the judges—when they consider 
its principles and find it to be incompatible with the superior power of the Constitution, it is 
their duty to pronounce it void.”); id. at 453 (“[T]he supreme power is in and retained by 
the people.”); id. at 492 (Dec. 4, 1787); id. at 517 (Dec. 7, 1787) (explicitly discussing federal 
legislation); see also id. at 524-25 (presenting a newspaper summary of Wilson’s statements); 
KRAMER, supra note 5, at 284 n.48 (discussing the response to Wilson). 
260.  3 DHRC, supra note 237, at 535, 553 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1978) (Jan. 7, 1788). Ellsworth added 
that “if the states go beyond their limits, if they make a law which is an usurpation upon the 
general government, the law is void; and upright, independent judges will declare it to be 
so.” Id. 
261.  6 DHRC, supra note 237, at 1395 (2000) (Feb. 1, 1788). 
262.  See, e.g., 9 DHRC, supra note 237, at 1070 (1990) (June 9, 1788) (Patrick Henry); cf. id. at 
1080 (Henry Lee) (discussing delegated powers); id. at 1141 (June 10, 1788) (James Monroe) 
(discussing the “propriety of [the] judiciary to judge on laws in contradistinction to [the] 
legislature”). 
263.  10 DHRC, supra note 237, at 1197 (1993) (June 12, 1788). In May 1788, Pendleton, as 
President of the Virginia Court of Appeals, had written the Assembly that a bill relating to 
the district courts was “contrary to the Spirit of the [Virginia] Constitution.” Letter from 
Charles Lee to George Washington (May 14, 1788), in 9 DHRC, supra note 237, at 797, 798 
n.2 (1990). 
BILDER FORMATTED_08-28-06 12/6/2006 5:58:03 PM 
the yale law journal 116:502   2006 
552 
 
country, that the acts of the Legislature, if unconstitutional, are liable to be 
opposed by the Judiciary.”264 George Nicholas declared that “in all well 
regulated communities,” if the legislature exceeds its powers, “the Judiciary 
will declare it void.”265 George Mason read the Constitution as giving “an 
express power . . . to the Federal Court, to take cognizance of such 
controversies, and to declare null all ex post facto laws.”266 John Marshall 
proclaimed that, if Congress went beyond its delegated enumerated powers, “it 
would be considered by the Judges as an infringement of the Constitution 
which they are to guard:—They would not consider such a law as coming 
under their jurisdiction.—They would declare it void.”267 
Supporters and opponents of the Constitution in newspaper editorials 
made the same assumption. In Maryland, “Aristides” stated that every state or 
federal judge “will have a right to reject any act, handed to him as a law, which 
he may conceive repugnant to the constitution.”268 In Virginia, Alexander 
White wrote that, “should Congress attempt to exercise any powers which are 
not expressly delegated to them, their acts would be considered as void, and 
disregarded.”269 In Pennsylvania, “Centinel” stated that if “Congress be 
disposed to violate” the Constitution, “they would be prevented” by “the 
supreme court . . . whose province it would be to determine the 
constitutionality of any law.”270 In New York, a “Republican” worried that 
certain laws by the legislature might “come under the description of ex post 
facto laws, and as repugnant to the constitution, be nugatory and void.”271 
 
264.  10 DHRC, supra note 237, at 1219-20 (1993) (June 12, 1788). Henry also noted that, if 
Congress altered a constitutional clause, “the Federal Judges, if they spoke the sentiments of 
independent men, would declare their prohibition nugatory and void.” Id. at 1420-21 (June 
20, 1788). 
265.  Id. at 1327 (June 16, 1788). 
266.  Id. at 1361 (June 17, 1788). 
267.  Id. at 1431 (June 20, 1788); see also id. at 1432 (“To what quarter will you look for protection 
from an infringement on the Constitution, if you will not give the power to the Judiciary?”). 
William Grayson echoed Marshall, stating that “[i]f the Congress cannot make a law against 
the Constitution, I apprehend they cannot make a law to abridge it,” for “[t]he Judges are to 
defend it,” and “[t]hey can neither abridge nor extend it.” Id. at 1448 (June 21, 1788). 
268.  ARISTIDES [ALEXANDER CONTEE HANSON], REMARKS ON THE PROPOSED PLAN (1788), 
reprinted in 15 DHRC, supra note 237, at 522, 531 (1984). 
269.  Alexander White, To the Citizens of Virginia, GAZETTE (Winchester, Va.), Feb. 29, 1788, 
reprinted in 8 DHRC, supra note 237, at 438, 438 (1988). 
270.  Centinel XVI [Samuel Bryan], To the People of Pennsylvania, PHILA. INDEP. GAZETTEER, Feb. 
26, 1788, reprinted in 16 DHRC, supra note 237, at 217, 219-20 (1986). 
271.  A Republican, N.Y. J., Dec. 27, 1787, reprinted in 19 DHRC, supra note 237, at 473, 474 (2003). 
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Even the critic of judicial review, the Anti-Federalist writer “Brutus,” 
assumed that the practice would continue under the Constitution.272 In 
Number 11, he noted that the “legislatures must be controuled by the 
constitution, and not the constitution by them.”273 In Number 12, he explained 
that “the supreme court has the power . . . to determine all questions that may 
arise in the course of legal discussion, on the meaning and construction of the 
constitution.”274 The Court would “take no notice” of laws which, “in the 
judgment of the court,” are repugnant to the Constitution; to do otherwise 
would be to “make a superior law give way to an inferior.”275 In Number 15, he 
explained that if “the legislature pass any laws, inconsistent with the sense the 
judges put upon the constitution, they will declare it void.”276 Brutus 
nonetheless criticized the Constitution for the practice.277 As he famously 
wrote, the judges would be “independent of the people, of the legislature, and 
of every power under heaven.”278 He wished “construction of the constitution” 
had been placed with the legislature.279 Yet Brutus was surprisingly reticent 
about an alternate solution and seemed ultimately to think impeachment a 
 
272.  Brutus XI through XVI address the judicial power. Robert Yates is thought to be a possible 
author. See 2 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 258, at 1111 n.40.2. 
273.  Brutus XI, N.Y. J., Jan. 31, 1788, reprinted in 2 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra 
note 258, at 129, 132. 
274.  Brutus XII, N.Y. J., Feb. 7 & 14, 1788, reprinted in 2 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, 
supra note 258, at 171, 171-72. 
275.  Id., reprinted in 2 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 258, at 172. He also wrote 
that courts “are vested with the supreme and uncontroulable power, to determine, in all 
cases that come before them, what the constitution means; they cannot, therefore, execute a 
law, which, in their judgment, opposes the constitution, unless we can suppose they can 
make a superior law give way to an inferior.” Brutus was worried that the courts would 
interpret the legislative power broadly, thus expanding the national government. Id., 
reprinted in 2 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 258, at 172; see also id., reprinted 
in 2 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 258, at 177; Brutus XIII, N.Y. J., Feb. 21, 
1788, reprinted in 2 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 258, at 222, 222 (“The 
proper province of the judicial power . . . is . . . to declare what is the law of the land.”). 
276.  Brutus XV, N.Y. J., Mar. 20, 1788, reprinted in 2 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra 
note 258, at 372, 376. 
277.  Id., reprinted in 2 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 258, at 372 (comparing 
America, where the power of the judges is “superior to the legislature,” with England, where 
the judges “in no instance assume the authority to set aside an act of parliament under the 
idea that it is inconsistent with their constitution”). 
278.  Id., reprinted in 2 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 258, at 373. 
279.  Id., reprinted in 2 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 258, at 377. 
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sufficient check because it gave the legislature “judicial powers in the last 
resort.”280 
This context illuminates the most famous discussion of judicial review by 
“Publius”—Alexander Hamilton—in The Federalist No. 78. Prior to the 
appearance of the Brutus editorials, Hamilton had assumed judicial review: the 
judges “would pronounce the resolutions” of a factious legislative majority “to 
be contrary to the supreme law of the land, unconstitutional and void.”281 
Brutus’s comments led Hamilton to explain that judicial review was an 
unavoidable consequence of limited legislative power. Hamilton repeated that 
the “duty” of courts of justice “must be to declare all acts contrary to the 
manifest tenor of the constitution void.”282 He referred to this standard as one 
about “repugnancy.”283 He explained that this “right” to pronounce contrary 
 
280.  Brutus XVI, N.Y. J., Apr. 10, 1788, reprinted in 20 DHRC, supra note 237, at 907, 911 (John P. 
Kaminski et al. eds., 2004); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 81 (Alexander Hamilton), supra 
note 258, reprinted in 2 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 258, at 483, 486-87 
(reading the impeachment power as a constitutional check on the judiciary in cases of “a 
series of deliberate usurpations on the authority of the legislature”). A recommended 
amendment permitted the President to nominate a commission to correct and review 
Supreme Court judgments. Recommendatory Amendments, POUGHKEEPSIE (N.Y.) COUNTRY 
J., Aug. 12, 1788, reprinted in 18 DHRC, supra note 237, at 301, 305 (1995); see Letter from 
Gaspard Joseph Amand Ducher to Comte de la Luzerne (Aug. 25, 1788), in 18 DHRC, supra 
note 237, at 345, 349 (1995). For a similar reading of Brutus’s understanding of judicial 
review, see HULSEBOSCH, supra note 187, at 250. 
281.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 16 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 258, reprinted in 1 THE DEBATE ON 
THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 258, at 451, 455. In The Federalist No. 22, Hamilton explained 
that the “want of a judiciary power” marred the Articles of Confederation, because “[l]aws 
are a dead letter without courts to expound and define their true meaning and operation.” 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 22 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 258, reprinted in 1 THE DEBATE ON 
THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 258, at 507, 513. 
282.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 258, reprinted in 2 THE DEBATE ON 
THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 258, at 467, 469; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 80 (Alexander 
Hamilton), supra note 258, reprinted in 2 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 258, 
at 476, 476-77 (discussing the reason for “authority in the federal courts, to over-rule” state 
laws in “manifest contravention of the articles of Union”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 81 
(Alexander Hamilton), supra note 258, reprinted in 2 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, 
supra note 258, at 484 (stating that “the general theory of a limited constitution” meant that 
“the constitution ought to be the standard of construction for the laws” and that the 
Constitution attempted “to set bounds to the legislative discretion”). 
283.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 258, reprinted in 2 THE DEBATE ON 
THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 258, at 471 (pointing out that the criticism that “courts on 
the pretence of a repugnancy, may substitute their own pleasure to the constitutional 
intentions of the legislature” would apply to “contradictory statutes” or any case of statutory 
interpretation); see also BILDER, supra note 31, at 192 (discussing Hamilton’s use of 
“repugnant” and “repugnancy” in The Federalist Nos. 32 and 78); HULSEBOSCH, supra note 
187, at 247-48 (discussing Hamilton’s use of the concept in The Federalist No. 78). 
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legislative acts void did not “suppose a superiority of the judicial to the 
legislative power.”284 Rather, it was that “every act of a delegated authority, 
contrary to the tenor of” its commission, “is void.”285 American 
constitutionalism was merely a new version of an old practice involving 
delegated authorities. Here, “the power of the people” is superior to both 
legislative and judicial power; judges were to be governed by the will of the 
“people . . . declared in the Constitution,” and “[n]o legislative act, therefore, 
contrary to the Constitution, can be valid.”286 For Hamilton, in short, judicial 
review was inescapable. 
iii. the practice of repugnancy 
The American practice of judicial review was based on repugnancy and 
constitutional contraints on delegated legislative authority. Seventeenth-
century statements about fundamental law did not create the practice. Late-
eighteenth-century concerns over a separation of powers did not shake it. 
Early-nineteenth-century desires for popular legislative sovereignty had 
surprisingly little impact on its existence. 
After ratification, “repugnancy” and judicial review continued.287 
“Repugnancy” explicitly governed federal review of state legislation. Section 25 
of the Judiciary Act of 1789 gave the Supreme Court jurisdiction when a state 
court upheld a state statute or authority against the claim that it was 
“repugnant to the constitution, treaties or laws of the United States.”288 As 
Luther Martin described, “If the constitution admits of any construction 
necessarily repugnant to the laws of the state, it is a repeal of them,” for “[a]ll 
 
284.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 258, reprinted in 2 THE DEBATE ON 
THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 258, at 467-68. 
285.  Id., reprinted in 2 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 258, at 467. 
286.  Id., reprinted in 2 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 258, at 467-68. 
287.  The repugnancy principle also continued to appear in its original guise when state courts 
reviewed claims that the bylaws of municipal corporations were repugnant to the state 
constitution. See Carlisle v. Baker, 1 Yeates 471, 473 (Pa. 1795) (discussing the 1789 
Philadelphia incorporation act that gave authority for “laws and ordinances, ‘provided the 
same shall not be repugnant to the laws and constitution of this commonwealth’”); see also 
Respublica v. Duquet, 2 Yeates 493, 497 (Pa. 1799); Zylstra v. Corp. of Charleston, 1 S.C.L. 
(1 Bay) 382 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1794). 
288.  Ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85-86; see Wallace Mendelson, The Judiciary Act of 1789: The Formal 
Origin of Federal Judicial Review, 76 JUDICATURE 133 (1992); Newmyer, supra note 32, at 846-
48. 
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acts inconsistent with the constitution are null and void.”289 “Repugnancy” 
also seemed to govern federal review of federal legislation. James Wilson’s 
Lectures on Law (1790-1791) posited “that the legislature should pass an act, 
manifestly repugnant to some part of the constitution . . . and that the 
operation and validity” of the act came before a court. The answer to “[w]hat is 
the law of the land?” was a “very easy one.”290 Wilson explained that the 
congressional act would be “void” because it was a “subordinate power.”291 The 
judicial department was not made “superiour,” but rather was given “in 
particular instances, and for particular purposes, the power of declaring and 
enforcing the superiour power of the constitution—the supreme law of the 
land.”292 
In state courts, judges echoed the familiar rhetoric, repeatedly embracing 
“repugnancy” as the standard.293 In 1793, in the Virginia General Court, Judge 
Roane explained that the legislature was “not sovereign but subordinate” to the 
state constitution.294 The “judiciary may and ought to adjudge a law 
 
289.  State v. Sluby, 2 H. & McH. 480, 481 (Md. 1790) (deciding whether the Constitution 
repealed state revenue laws); see also Campbell v. Morris, 3 H. & McH. 535, 565 (Md. 1797) 
(considering whether a state law relating to attachment was “repugnant to the 4th article of 
the federal constitution” by violating the Privileges and Immunities Clause); Donaldson v. 
Harvey, 3 H. & McH. 12, 14 (Md. 1790) (presenting the plaintiff’s argument that the 
Constitution was “supreme law . . . and the act of [the] assembly is repugnant to it” in a case 
concerning whether the Constitution repealed a state law relating to antecedent debts). 
290.  1 JAMES WILSON, Comparison of the Constitution of the United States, with That of Great Britain 
(1790), in THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 51, at 309, 329-30. 
291.  Id. at 330.  
292.  Id.; see 1 JAMES WILSON, Of Government (1790), in THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 
51, at 284, 300 (arguing that the legislative power is subject to a “given degree of control by 
the judiciary department, whenever the laws, though in fact passed, are found to be 
contradictory to the constitution”). 
293.  Discussion of these cases dates to the nineteenth century. See, e.g., QUINCY, supra note 5, 
app. 1, at 528 n.29, 529 n.31, 530 n.33; Meigs, supra note 219, at 185-88. As discussed supra 
note 30, Connecticut and Rhode Island retained their colonial charters as state constitutions, 
continued their doctrines of legislative supremacy, and did not embrace judicial review as 
readily. See BILDER, supra note 31, at 191, 279 n.11 (noting that Rhode Island did not accept 
state judicial review until approximately 1856); 1 ZEPHANIAH SWIFT, A SYSTEM OF THE LAWS 
OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 50-54 (1795) (arguing against judicial review in his 
discussion of the “laws of Connecticut”). 
294.  Kamper v. Hawkins, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 20, 36 (1793) (Roane, J.). The court in Kamper 
considered an act of the assembly relating to district court judges. The possible interference 
with the state legislature appeared stronger because the Virginia Constitution of 1776 had 
never gone through a ratification process and thus looked suspiciously like ordinary 
legislation. Previously, in 1788, the court of appeals had decided that a “law contrary to the 
constitution” was void. Id. at 23 (Nelson, J.). Several judges reiterated their basic 
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unconstitutional and void, if it be plainly repugnant to the letter of the 
Constitution, or the fundamental principles thereof.”295 In North Carolina in 
1794, Judge Williams declared that judges “are to administer the constitutional 
laws, not such as are repugnant to the constitution.”296 In South Carolina in 
1796, Judge Waites concluded that “[i]f an act of the legislature is held void, it 
is not because the judges have any control over the legislative power, but 
because the act is forbidden by the constitution.”297 In Pennsylvania in 1799, 
the supreme court considered whether acts were “repugnant to the 
constitution.”298 In Vermont, the supreme court heard arguments as to 
whether a state act was “unconstitutional, and therefore void; being manifestly 
repugnant to” a clause in the “general Constitution.”299 In New Jersey in 1802, 
 
understanding of constrained legislation in the wake of Brutus’s argument that “declaring 
an act of the legislature to be no law, assumes legislative authority, or claims a superiority 
over the legislature.” E.g., id. at 30. 
295.  Id. at 40 (Roane, J.); see also id. at 35-36 (“[T]he judiciary may and ought not only to refuse 
to execute a law expressly repugnant to the Constitution; but also one which is, by a plain 
and natural construction, in opposition to the fundamental principles thereof.”). Judge 
Tyler noted that while he would not “in an extra-judicial manner assume the right to 
negative a law,” he would not shrink from the question “how far the law be a violation of 
the constitution.” Id. at 61 (Tyler, J.). Judge Tucker simply cited at length from The 
Federalist No. 78, finding it “so full, so apposite, and so conclusive” that it was “unnecessary 
to add any thing farther on the subject.” Id. at 84 (Tucker, J.). Judge Roane did not see “any 
express provision in, or fundamental principle of, the constitution, restricting the power of 
the legislature in this respect.” Id. at 44-45 (Roane, J.). Judge Henry was oblique on the 
issue but did note that the English model in which “Parliament was omnipotent, and their 
powers beyond control” had not been followed. Id. at 48 (Henry, J.). He also noted that the 
colonial legislature had had “no bounds to their authority but the negative of the crown.” Id. 
296.  State v. [ ], 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 28, 29 (1794); see also Trs. of the Univ. v. Foy, 3 N.C. (2 
Hayw.) 310, 316 (1804) (argument of plaintiff’s counsel) (“[T]here can be no doubt, that 
every act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is absolutely void.” (quoting 
Vanhorne’s Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 308 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795))); Jones v. Jones, 
2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 488, 491 (1797) (presenting an attorney’s statement that acts “not 
repugnant to that constitution, must be enforced”). 
297.  Lindsay v. Comm’rs, 2 S.C.L. (2 Bay) 38, 61-62 (Constitutional Ct. App. 1796); see id. at 62 
(noting also that the act was “repugnant” to the constitution); see also Bowman v. 
Middleton, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 252, 254 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1792) (voiding an act as “against common 
right and reason as well as against magna charta”). 
298.  Ex parte Blair M’Clenachan, 2 Yeates 502, 505 (Pa. 1799); see also Respublica v. Duquet, 2 
Yeates 493, 501 (Pa. 1799) (“[A] breach of the constitution by the legislature, and the 
clashing of the law with the constitution, must be evident indeed, before . . . declar[ing] a 
law void . . . ; yet if a violation of the constitution should . . . be made . . . we shall think it 
our duty . . . of saying such law is void.”). 
299.  Doe ex dem. Forbes v. Smith, 1 Tyl. 38, 38, 40 (Vt. 1801) (relating to retrospective laws); see 
also Kinne v. Plumb, 1 Tyl. 20, 22 (Vt. 1801) (discussing a state law permitting county courts 
to make rules so long as they are not “repugnant to the constitution or laws of the State”). 
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the supreme court stated that “[t]he legislature act[s] by delegated and 
circumscribed authority.”300 The court noted the “uniform course of decision” 
in the states and the United States Supreme Court that courts could declare 
unconstitutional laws void.301 That same year, the Maryland General Court 
noted that two arguments—that “an act of assembly repugnant to the 
constitution is void” and that the court had a right to so determine—had not 
been controverted in the case at hand or in any case before the court.302 
Supreme Court Justices on circuit accepted the practice. In 1791, in a series 
of actions that led to Hayburn’s Case, the Justices refused to carry into effect the 
federal statute designating circuit courts to report on pension cases of disabled 
officers and soldiers.303 Although the objections included the rationale that the 
duty was “not of a judicial nature,” each letter implied that the act was 
unconstitutional if construed to require judges as an official matter to consider 
the cases.304 In 1795 in Vanhorne’s Lessee v. Dorrance, Justice Paterson on circuit 
stated that legislatures are “[c]reatures of the Constitution; they owe their 
existence to the Constitution: they derive their powers from the Constitution: 
. . . all their acts must be conformable to it, or else they will be void.”305 He 
 
300.  State v. Parkhurst, 9 N.J.L. (4 Halst.) 427, 443 (1802). 
301.  Id. at 444. The court stated that the question whether it could control legislation contrary to 
the state constitution was a “question which of late years has been considerably agitated in 
these United States.” Id. 
302.  Whittington v. Polk, 1 H. & J. 236, 242 (Md. Gen. Ct. 1802). Chief Judge Chase explained 
the limited nature of legislative power and the court’s obligation to decide cases judicially 
brought before it. Id. at 242-45 (Chase, C.J.). 
303.  2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 412-13 n.† (1792) (reproducing Attorney General Randolph’s argument 
and the North Carolina circuit court letter of Iredell and Sitgreaves). 
304.  See id. at 410 n.† (reproducing the New York circuit court’s statement by Circuit Justices Jay 
and Cushing and Judge Duane that “neither the Legislative nor the Executive branches, can 
constitutionally assign” nonjudicial duties to the judicial branch); id. at 412 n.† (providing 
the Pennsylvania circuit court’s description of the problem by Circuit Justices Wilson and 
Blair and Judge Peters as to “be obliged to act contrary, either to the obvious directions of 
Congress, or to a constitutional principle, in our judgment equally obvious”); id. at 412-13 
n.† (providing the North Carolina circuit court’s explanation that “courts cannot be 
warranted . . . by virtue of that part of the Constitution . . . for the exercise of which any act 
of the legislature is provided . . . or . . . not provided for upon the terms the Constitution 
requires”). 
305.  2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 308 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795) (declaring the Pennsylvania confirming act void). 
Pennsylvania had passed a “confirming act” in 1787 that sought to settle long-disputed land 
claims between Connecticut and Pennsylvania settlers and to compensate Pennsylvania 
claimants who thereby lost land. Id. at 313, 316. Paterson drew a distinction between the 
United States and England, where “the authority of the Parliament runs without limits, and 
rises above controul,” “the validity of an act of Parliament cannot be drawn into question by 
the judicial department,” and there was “no written constitution, no fundamental law, 
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declared, “Whatever may be the case in other countries, yet in this there can be 
no doubt, that every act of the Legislature, repugnant to the Constitution, is 
absolutely void.”306 In such a case, “it will be the duty of the Court to adhere to 
the Constitution, and to declare the act null and void.”307 
On the Supreme Court, the Justices continued to repeat the rhetoric. In 
1798, in Calder v. Bull,308 Justice Iredell stated that if “any act of Congress” or a 
state legislature violates provisions of the federal Constitution, “it is 
unquestionably void.”309 Justice Chase noted that if he “ever exercise[d] the 
jurisdiction” to declare a law void under the Ex Post Facto Clause, he would 
“not decide any law to be void, but in a very clear case.”310 In 1800, the Court 
considered in Cooper v. Telfair the proposition that if “the law is contrary to the 
constitution, the law is void; and the judiciary authority . . . may pronounce it 
to be so.”311 In his opinion in Cooper, Chase emphasized that, although the 
 
nothing visible, nothing real, nothing certain, by which a statute can be tested.” Id. at 308. 
Paterson noted that “[i]n America the case is widely different.” Id. 
306.  Id. at 308; see also id. at 309 (“I take it to be a clear position; that if a legislative act oppugns a 
constitutional principle, the former must give way, and be rejected on the score of 
repugnance.”). 
307.  Id. at 309. 
308.  3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798). The Connecticut legislature had granted a new hearing in a 
probate case. The case involved the application of post-1787 constitutional ideas to colonial 
constitutional practices because Connecticut retained its colonial charter as a constitution 
and its legislature had long sat as the highest judicial power. In August 1797, Stephen 
Twining, arguing for judicial review in a moot at Connecticut’s Litchfield Law School, 
stated that the Supreme Court had decided the question. See Donald F. Melhorn, Jr., A Moot 
Court Exercise: Debating Judicial Review Prior to Marbury v. Madison, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 
327, 340-41 (1995). One possible precedent is Chandler v. Secretary of War (U.S. 1794) (no 
extant report), which is discussed in Marbury. See Sherman, supra note 19. 
309.  Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 399 (Iredell, J.). He added that “as the authority to declare it void 
is of a delicate and awful nature, the Court will never resort to that authority, but in a clear 
and urgent case.” Id. He noted that the Court could not, however, declare it void “merely 
because it is, in their judgment, contrary to the principles of natural justice.” Id. 
310.  Id. at 395 (Chase, J.) (emphasis omitted). Justice Chase had earlier commented that he was 
not giving “an opinion, at this time, whether this Court has jurisdiction to decide that any 
law made by Congress, contrary to the Constitution of the United States, is void.” Id. at 392 
(emphasis omitted). 
311.  4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 14, 16 (1800) (concerning a state law claimed to be “repugnant to the true 
intent and meaning” of the state constitution). The Court found grounds to declare the law 
void, though the Justices differed on the standard to apply in voiding repugnant legislation. 
Compare id. at 18 (Washington, J.) (favoring a presumption of validity and asking whether 
the act was “so repugnant to any constitutional regulation, as to be excepted from the 
legislative jurisdiction, by a necessary implication”), and id. at 19 (Paterson, J.) (arguing that 
a “clear and unequivocal breach of the constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative 
implication,” was required), with id. at 18 (Chase, J.) (arguing that the “general principles” 
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Supreme Court had never actually adjudicated the question, the “general 
opinion,” “all this bar,” and “some of the Judges . . . individually, in the 
Circuits” had so decided.312 
In 1803, Chief Justice John Marshall correctly acknowledged that “long and 
well established” principles addressed “the question, whether an act, repugnant 
to the constitution, can become the law of the land.”313 He was equally right 
that the question was “happily, not of an intricacy proportioned to its 
interest.”314 The question had not been addressed in Charles Lee’s argument 
before the Court and was perhaps occasioned by Chase’s comment that the 
Court had never explicitly decided the question. Marshall’s opinion patched 
together the familiar phrases, repeatedly emphasizing repugnancy.315 “The 
powers of the legislature are defined, and limited”; thus, it was a “proposition 
too plain to be contested, that the constitution controls any legislative act 
repugnant to it.”316 An act of the legislature, repugnant to the Constitution, 
could not “bind the courts, and oblige them to give it effect.”317 Marshall 
concluded that “a law repugnant to the constitution is void; and that courts . . . 
are bound by that instrument.”318 Accepting the well-established and long-
practiced idea of limited legislative authority, American constitutional law 
recommitted itself to a practice over four centuries old. 
Despite the repeated criticisms of Marbury voiced by those such as Thomas 
Jefferson, for most of the nineteenth century the explanation for the practice 
 
of the state constitution were “not to be regarded as rules to fetter and controul; but as 
matter merely declaratory and directory”). The defendant’s argument appears to have 
attempted to contrast a state’s sovereignty with the limited bylaw authority of corporations. 
Id. at 17. A similar struggle over the differences between states and corporations occurs in 
Justice Iredell’s argument in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 446-48 (1793) (Iredell, 
J.). 
312.  Cooper, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) at 19 (Chase, J.); see also id. at 20 (Cushing, J.) (expressing a belief 
that the Supreme Court had the power “to declare the law void”); Gerber, supra note 14, at 
11 (arguing that the “pre-Marshall Court justices understood the concept of judicial review, 
that they argued for it, and that they practiced it”). For a discussion of the presumption of 
judicial review in United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (1803), see Mark A. 
Graber, Establishing Judicial Review? Schooner Peggy and the Early Marshall Court, 51 POL. 
RES. Q. 221 (1998). 
313.  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803). On the surrounding politics, see 
James M. O’Fallon, Marbury, 44 STAN. L. REV. 219 (1992). 
314.  Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176. 
315.  Id. at 176-77, 180. 
316.  Id. at 176, 177. Marshall pointed out there was “no middle ground”; the Constitution either 
controlled legislation or it did not. Id. at 177. 
317.  Id. at 177. 
318.  Id. at 180. 
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and the use of “repugnant” initially remained unchanged.319 As Chancellor 
Kent noted in his treatise, if “the Constitution does not control any legislative 
act repugnant to it, then the legislature may alter the Constitution by an 
ordinary act.” The theory of government based on a written constitution must 
be “that an act of the legislature repugnant to the Constitution is void” and the 
judiciary must so declare it.320 Other nineteenth-century commentators 
repeated the constrained legislation theory.321 In 1889, J.C. Bancroft Davis, the 
Supreme Court reporter, could list more than 200 cases in which “Statutes or 
Ordinances Have Been Held To Be Repugnant to the Constitution or Laws of 
the United States.”322 
The late nineteenth century brought an end to the ease with which the 
practice could be justified by repeating the repugnancy rhetoric. Supreme 
Court decisions striking down an increased number of congressional acts 
brought new critics.323 In 1893, Harvard law professor James Bradley Thayer 
 
319.  On the Jefferson critique, see Robert J. Reinstein & Mark C. Rahdert, Reconstructing 
Marbury, 57 ARK. L. REV. 729, 755 n.135 (2005). For discussion of early citations of Marbury 
mostly focusing on “technical” points relating to jurisdiction or mandamus, see David E. 
Marion, Judicial Faithfulness or Wandering Indulgence? Original Intentions and the History of 
Marbury v. Madison, 57 ALA. L. REV. 1041, 1043-44 (2006). 
320.  1 KENT, supra note 3, at 453; see also 3 STORY, supra note 207, § 1570, at 428-35 (justifying 
judicial review under the theory of constitutionally constrained legislation). 
321.  See, e.g., THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH 
REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 159-88 
(Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1868); THOMAS SERGEANT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: BEING A 
VIEW OF THE PRACTICE AND JURISDICTION OF THE UNITED STATES, AND OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL POINTS DECIDED 306, 308, 332 (Phila., P.H. Nicklin & T. Johnson 2d ed. 
1830) (discussing instances in which state legislation was “repugnant” to Article I of the 
Constitution); id. at 403 (“[I]f the law of a state be repugnant to, or incompatible with 
the constitution of the United States . . . it is void . . . . It seems, however, that this power 
of declaring an act of Congress or a law unconstitutional, will be exercised only in a clear 
case.”). 
322.  131 U.S. app. at ccxxxv (1889). The list included twenty cases concerning federal statutes 
and 181 cases concerning state statutes. Id. app. at ccxxxv-cclxiii. Coxe argued that there 
were 177 in all. See COXE, supra note 5, at 22. A Westlaw search for “repugnant /s 
constitution” in the “sct” database produced the following number of cases: 7 (1793-1809); 
11 (1810-1819); 18 (1820-1829); 22 (1830-1839); 32 (1840-1849); 29 (1850-1859); 36 (1860-
1869); 71 (1870-1879); and 81 (1880-1889). (Results have not been examined for 
overinclusiveness.) “Repugnant” often appeared because 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) provides for a 
writ of certiorari to state supreme courts when “the validity of a statute of any State is drawn 
in question on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the 
United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (2000). 
323.  See, e.g., The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 
(1883); Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879); United States v. Fox, 95 U.S. 670 (1878); 
United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876); United States v. R.R., 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 322 
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summarized the conventional explanation for the Court’s voiding acts as 
repugnant to the Constitution, stating that the “legislature had only a 
delegated and limited authority under the constitutions; that these restraints 
. . . must be regarded as so much law; and, as being law, that they must be 
interpreted and applied by the court.”324 He then mocked this reasoning, 
calling it a “severe line of argument” that treated the Constitution as if it were 
“a private letter of attorney.”325 Thayer declared that the practice had been “put 
as a mere matter of course” and repeatedly condemned the underlying theory 
as “simple.”326 
Permanently transforming the discussion from its focus on legislative 
power, Thayer focused on the “clear limits of judicial power.”327 He subtly and 
implicitly rejected the longstanding claim that judicial review was justified 
because legislative power was delegated and constrained by the Constitution. 
Thayer argued that courts were not advancing “merely their own judgment as 
to constitutionality, but their conclusion as to what judgment is permissible to 
another department which the constitution has charged with the duty of 
making it.”328 He embraced the “great range of possible harm and evil” that 
was and must be left open to the legislatures and rejected the belief that the 
“power of courts” could “save a people from ruin.”329 
Thayer, however, could not abandon years of practice of constrained 
legislative power. He suggested a compromise—a “rule of administration.”330 
 
(1873); United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872); Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 
Wall.) 113 (1871); Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1870); Justices v. Murray, 76 
U.S. (9 Wall.) 274 (1869); United States v. Dewitt, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 41 (1869); see also 131 
U.S. app. at ccxxxvi-ccxxxvii (listing additional cases in which the Supreme Court held 
statutes of the United States repugnant to the Constitution or laws of the United States). 
Davis claimed that seven cases prior to 1869 had held federal statutes void. Id. app. at 
ccxxxv-ccxxxvi. The list in the U.S. Reports included United States v. Todd (U.S. 1794), 
reported in United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 40, 52 (1851), and Hayburn’s Case, 2 
U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792), and did not include Scott v. Sandford (Dred Scott), 60 U.S. (19 
How.) 393 (1857). For a critique, see COXE, supra note 5, at 8-23. Coxe also discussed 
Chandler v. Secretary of War. Id. at 14-17 (referring to the case as “— v. Secretary of War”). 
324.  James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. 
L. REV. 129, 138 (1893). 
325.  Id. at 139. 
326.  Id. at 138-39; see id. (using such terms as “very simple ground,” “simple and narrow,” or 
“simple precepts”). 
327.  Id. at 156. 
328.  Id. at 144. 
329.  Id. at 156. 
330.  Id. at 140. 
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He read the early cases for comments about what might now be seen as the 
concerns of scope and departmentalism. Thayer focused on the language in 
which judges had referred to “clear,” “plain,” or “manifest” violations and 
invalidities so “obviously repugnant” that “all men of sense and reflection in 
the community may perceive the repugnancy.”331 He pointed to earlier judicial 
comments regarding deference, respect, and presumptions in favor of the 
legislative branch.332 Thayer converted these discussions into a test based on 
whether a reasonable legislature could have thought the law constitutional—
what modern constitutional law has come to describe as a rational basis, 
reasonableness, or minimalist test.333 
Repugnancy began to vanish. By the twentieth century, Princeton professor 
Edward S. Corwin’s studies of what he termed “judicial review” continued to 
shift the discussion away from legislative constraint and toward judicial 
power.334 The reasons for repugnancy’s demise lie outside this Article. Perhaps 
“repugnant” began to carry its colloquial connotation of value-laden 
offensiveness or repulsiveness, not inconsistency or contradiction. Perhaps a 
court deciding repugnancy seemed like a court deciding its personal social 
preferences. Whatever the reasons, although the Court continued to use the 
phrase “repugnant to the Constitution” into the 1920s, the lines over the 
judiciary’s declaration of unconstitutional acts had been redrawn.335 The debate 
over judicial review has continued to focus less on constraints on legislative 
power than on the legitimacy or illegitimacy of judicial power and the 
 
331.  Id. at 140-42. 
332.  Id. at 142, 145. 
333.  Id. at 148-49. For a discussion of Thayer’s article and test, see One Hundred Years of Judicial 
Review: The Thayer Centennial Symposium, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (1993). Although in an 
earlier letter in The Nation, Thayer had hinted that questions of “personal right under the 
Constitution” might fall outside of his reasonableness test, the reference did not reappear in 
the article. James B. Thayer, Constitutionality of Legislation: The Precise Question for a Court, 
38 NATION 314 (1884). 
334.  EDWARD S. CORWIN, COURT OVER CONSTITUTION: A STUDY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW AS AN 
INSTRUMENT OF POPULAR GOVERNMENT (1938); EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE DOCTRINE OF 
JUDICIAL REVIEW: ITS LEGAL AND HISTORICAL BASIS AND OTHER ESSAYS (1914); Edward S. 
Corwin, The Establishment of Judicial Review (pts. 1 & 2), 9 MICH. L. REV. 102, 283 (1910-
1911); Edward S. Corwin, The “Higher Law” Background of American Constitutional Law (pts. 
1 & 2), 42 HARV. L. REV. 149, 365 (1928-1929); Corwin, supra note 5. 
335.  Appearances of “repugnancy” fell dramatically after 1920. A Westlaw search for “repugnant 
/s constitution” in the “sct” database produced the following number of cases: 81 (1880-
1889); 130 (1890-1899); 164 (1900-1909); 171 (1910-1919); and 65 (1920-1929). (Results 
have not been examined for overinclusiveness.) 
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appropriate standard. “Repugnancy” has nearly disappeared from Supreme 
Court opinions.336 
conclusion 
The lost faith in the standard of “repugnancy” need not necessarily be 
regretted. Two centuries of further practice have limited our ability to accept 
on faith that the Constitution always and necessarily represents the will of the 
people, that the legislature’s lawmaking authority should be narrowly limited 
by the text of a Constitution notoriously difficult to change, and that judges 
can simply declare when legislation is repugnant to the Constitution. 
Nonetheless, modern discussions of judicial review often may dwell too 
exclusively on the idea of judicial review as imposed by judges on democratic 
politics. 
While today we may better appreciate the difficulties with the repugnancy 
practice, we might do well to recall the power of this belief in the legislatively 
constrained nature of a delegated authority. As Daniel Farber and Suzanna 
Sherry have recently written, much of the angst among modern constitutional 
scholars comes from “a sense of innate conflict between democracy and judicial 
review.”337 But, as a matter of history, not everyone has seen the problem this 
way. The presumption that legislative power was necessarily constrained by 
constitutions and that judicial action was simply responding to this constraint 
originally overwhelmed alternative ways of understanding the relationship of 
legislatures, courts, and constitutions. This approach was neither disingenuous 
nor cursory; those who advanced it were not incapable of understanding the 
difficulties with judicial action. They simply believed deeply that American 
constitutionalism was based, first and foremost, on constraining legislation by 
the laws of the nation and, most importantly, the Constitution. This history 
can remind us that both legislative and judicial power are legitimated by the 
belief that the Constitution delegates the power of the people—an entity that 
exists over time—and thus may reinforce the belief in the bounded, yet 
changing, nature of the Constitution. 
This history of the repugnancy practice also presents a challenge to 
originalism and suggests one possible approach to the relevance of the history 
 
336.  A Westlaw search for “repugnant /s constitution” in the “sct” database produced the 
following number of cases: 65 (1920-1929); 66 (1930-1939); 29 (1940-1949); 15 (1950-
1959); 24 (1960-1969); 26 (1970-1979); 43 (1980-1989); 11 (1990-1999); and 5 (2000-
2006). (Results have not been examined for overinclusiveness.) 
337.  DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY: THE MISGUIDED 
QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS 140 (2002). 
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of the Framing for liberal constitutionalism.338 Originalism, whether phrased 
as an active verb of the intent of some person or persons or the passive noun of 
the meaning of constitutional text, assumes that the constitutional word, 
concept, or structure at issue is capable of being interpreted in a fixed sense in 
the initial constitutional moment and that this fixed intent or meaning is what 
binds constitutional interpretation.339 Originalism as practiced thus tends to 
limit the range of legitimate constitutional interpretations to issues that had 
been or were being explicitly confronted.340 
In this history of judicial review, however, what we find instead are 
assumptions. The courts’ ability to void repugnant legislation was simply 
assumed because of past corporate and colonial practices that limited 
legislation by the laws of the nation. Original intent fails to capture this 
history: judicial review was not the product of any intent by the Framing 
generation to create it, yet neither was it unintended, deliberately omitted, or 
rejected. The original meaning approach is seemingly more sympathetic to the 
problem of historical assumptions. Yet as applied, original meaning 
interpretations tend to convert particular assumptions into intent by 
concluding that the Founders intended to confine legitimate interpretations 
 
338.  For discussion of other difficulties, including the question whether originalists are bound by 
originalist understandings of originalism, see Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive 
Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519 (2003). For the originalism debate as a historical 
question, see generally LEVY, supra note 219; RAKOVE, supra note 21, at 339-65; and H. 
Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985). 
For the debate as a philosophical question, see generally DENNIS J. GOLDFORD, THE 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION AND THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINALISM (2005); KEITH E. 
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, 
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (1999); and CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, HOW TO READ THE 
CONSTITUTION: ORIGINALISM, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, AND JUDICIAL POWER 
(1996). 
339.  See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF 
LIBERTY 87-117 (2004) [hereinafter BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION] 
(arguing for “moderate” originalism based on “original meaning” instead of “original 
intent”); Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611 (1999). 
For a suggestion that the “practical differences between original meaning and original intent 
may be negligible,” see Douglas G. Smith, Does the Constitution Embody a “Presumption of 
Liberty”?, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 319, 325 (reviewing BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST 
CONSTITUTION, supra). See also Nelson, supra note 338, at 556-60 (discussing the difficulty 
of distinguishing between original meaning and original intent). For a discussion of 
“meaning,” “intent,” and “understanding,” see RAKOVE, supra note 21, at xiii, 7-8. 
340.  See Robert N. Clinton, Original Understanding, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of “This 
Constitution,” 72 IOWA L. REV. 1177, 1267 (1987) (constructing a flowchart for when original 
understanding interpretation is possible). 
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solely to those assumptions.341 Neither originalist approach persuasively 
addresses the contextual contingency inherent in the existence of constitutional 
assumptions.342 
History matters—not because it tells us what we should think about the 
Constitution, but because it suggests how we might think about it. The practice 
of voiding statutes under a repugnancy standard was presumed to be part of 
the original constitutional structure. The nature of this practice, however, was 
only partially reconceptualized in the language and ideologies of new American 
constitutionalism. While a Constitution of the people was understood as the 
supreme authority binding both legislature and judiciary, which laws suffered 
from repugnancy and when the coordinate branch of the judiciary should 
exercise its authority were problems not decisively answered in 1787. 
We can care about constitutional history without being constitutional 
originalists. If we replace the originalist search with a historical appreciation of 
assumptions, we might better articulate how certain structures and ideas were 
assumed to be part of the constitutional framework but were not fully 
articulated or conceived. We might come to accept that, while history can go 
far in assisting in the interpretation of constitutional questions, there are 
inherent limits to the inquiry. Rather than desire to know with unattainable 
certainty the Framing generation’s intent, we would perhaps do better to seek 
to understand the more attainable boundaries of their assumptions. 
 
341.  See BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION, supra note 339, at 131-47 (arguing for an 
“assumption” that judges could nullify unconstitutional laws and therefore that the 
assumption could not have been intended to include “judicial supremacy”). 
342.  Cf. Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Evolving Understandings of American Federalism: Some Shifting 
Parameters, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 635, 697-98 (2006) (making a similar point about 
originalist interpretations of constitutional federalism). 
